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Article 
Waiving Innocence 
Samuel R. Wiseman† 
INTRODUCTION 
When a procedural development opens a new door for crim-
inal defendants, it has a tendency to rapidly shut. Following 
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 
for example, courts have whittled away at the rights announced 
therein until they have become little more than formalities.1 
The same pattern emerged after Gideon v. Wainwright, as sub-
sequent decisions stretched the definition of counsel to include 
vastly overworked and/or underperforming attorneys.2 Similar-
ly, although the right to postconviction DNA testing has only re-
cently become well established, backsliding has already begun.  
DNA testing has enabled more than 270 wrongfully con-
victed individuals to prove their innocence3 and has cleared 
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expert help from Melanie Nelson. A University of Tulsa College of Law Sum-
mer Research Grant wholly supported this Article. Copyright © 2012 by Sam-
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 1. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling With Par-
ticular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona, 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–25 (2010) (describ-
ing the dismantling of Miranda and how cases have “invite[d] police officers to 
simply ignore it”); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wiscon-
sin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 667 (describing Mi-
randa’s lack of protection in practice); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (declaring a right to 
counsel); see David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 
GEO. L.J. 811, 818 (1976). 
 3. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ ( last visited 
Nov. 30, 2011) (showing 280 individuals exonerated as of November 19, 2011, 
 2012] WAIVING INNOCENCE 953 
 
countless innocent suspects at the investigative stage.4 DNA ev-
idence will, of course, not solve all of the flaws of current inves-
tigative, conviction, and sentencing procedures, but, in the ten-
to-twenty percent of criminal cases where DNA evidence is 
available,5 it is essential. If properly handled, tested, and char-
acterized in court, DNA evidence can offer the most definitive 
proof of a defendant’s innocence or guilt, thus providing cer-
tainty for all parties involved—including the victim.6 Unlike 
eyewitness testimony, DNA evidence does not rely upon fuzzy 
human memory, which can be dangerously influenced by many 
factors unrelated to the identity of the perpetrator.7 Nor does it 
rely upon the broad, often inconsistent standards governing the 
matching of a fingerprint8 or a piece of hair to a defendant.9 
 
and explaining that the project works to exonerate “wrongfully convicted indi-
viduals through DNA testing”).  
 4. See, e.g., Katherine L. Prevost O’Connor, Eliminating the Rape-Kit 
Backlog: Bringing Necessary Changes to the Criminal Justice System, 72 
UMKC L. REV. 193, 198 (2003) (discussing how testing can “quickly eliminate 
suspects who do not have the identified DNA blueprint”). 
 5. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent 
Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 655, 656 (2005) (explaining that approximately eighty to ninety per-
cent of cases lack biological evidence).  
 6. Cf. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., 
NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 114 (2009) (“Methods that 
are specified in more detail (such as DNA analysis, where particular genetic 
loci are to be compared) will have greater credibility and also are more ame-
nable to systematic improvement than those that rely more heavily on the 
judgments of the investigator.”) But see Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful 
Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 12–13) 
(noting the limitations of DNA evidence, such as its unavailability in many 
cases and its degradation over time), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902811.  
 7. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: 
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 55–113 (1995) (describing psy-
chological and other factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness testimo-
ny); C.D. Lefebvre et al., Use of Event-Related Brain Potentials (ERPs) to As-
sess Eyewitness Accuracy and Deception, 73 INT’L. J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 218, 
218 (2009) (referencing the “sizable body of research that has criticized and 
demonstrated the unreliability of eyewitness identifications”).  
 8. Cf. Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vul-
nerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–
76 (2006) (describing how out of “five fingerprint experts” with, together, “over 
85 years of experience in examining fingerprints,” eighty percent identified a 
different fingerprint match than they had identified of the same fingerprint 
five years earlier, highlighting the unreliability of fingerprinting). 
 9. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2092 (2000) (criticizing “inherently suspect hair compar-
isons”). Not all DNA evidence will establish guilt or innocence, of course. See 
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And perhaps even more importantly, DNA evidence can, in 
some cases, help illustrate flaws in the investigative and adju-
dicative processes and thereby reduce the rate of wrongful con-
viction in the many cases in which biological evidence is  
unavailable.10  
As a result, DNA has provoked a small revolution in crimi-
nal procedure,11 causing almost every state legislature, as well 
as Congress,12 to rethink well-established notions of finality in 
order to allow for post-conviction testing and relief. Moreover, 
two-thirds of these jurisdictions, recognizing the thoroughly 
documented pressures that lead some innocent defendants to 
plead guilty or nolo contendere,13 have extended the right to 
 
Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2949 
(2010) (“Most states adopt requirements that the DNA testing be potentially 
probative of innocence. Such a standard certainly makes sense. For example, 
DNA testing would serve no useful purpose in a case where the convict still 
concedes that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, but maintains that 
there was consent.”). 
 10. See Kruse, supra note 1, at 721 (describing DNA exoneration as “the 
‘gold standard’ of proof that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, allowing the 
opportunity to examine what went wrong in specific cases of wrongful convic-
tions and the implications that diagnosis might have for larger systemic re-
form”); Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687, 
720 (2010) (arguing that more detailed findings are important in DNA exoner-
ation cases in order to reveal the causes of wrongful convictions and provide 
lessons for courts); INNOCENCE COMMISSION FOR VA., http://www.icva.us/ 
exonerate.org/icva/index.html ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (explaining that the 
Virginia Innocence Commission was formed “[t]o assist in examining the prob-
lems that may lead to wrongful convictions”); Mission Statement, STATE OF 
CONN. JUD. BRANCH, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/ ( last visited Nov. 30, 
2011) (explaining that the commission, based on its examinations of wrongful 
convictions, “will suggest best practices for law enforcement, prosecutors, de-
fense attorneys, and judges that will decrease the possibility of convicting an 
innocent person”). See generally CALIFORNIA COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/ 
CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (recommending reforms based on its investigation of 
wrongful convictions). 
 11. See, e.g., Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) 
(“DNA evidence will undoubtedly lead to changes in the criminal justice sys-
tem. It has done so already.”). 
 12. See infra notes 14–22. 
 13. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430 (1998) 
(citing literature that documents “numerous case examples” of false confes-
sions); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 
1979, 1981 (1992) (observing that innocent defendants tend to be risk averse 
and therefore more likely to plead guilty); False Confessions, THE INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php 
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testing to those who did not insist on trial.14 This revolution—
while by no means complete—has extended to the rules govern-
 
( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“In about 25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent 
defendants made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or 
pled guilty.”). Of the first 225 DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project has 
identified fifty-one underlying convictions that resulted from a “[f ]alse confes-
sion/admission.” Causes of Wrongful Conviction, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
Twenty-three of these cases involved guilty pleas. When the Innocent Plead 
Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ 
When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php# ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 14. In 2008, Brandon Garrett identified forty-five states in total (plus the 
District of Columbia) that either grant statutory access to postconviction DNA 
testing or have a state supreme court-recognized right to postconviction DNA 
testing of “newly discovered evidence of innocence.” Brandon Garrett, Claim-
ing Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1673–74 (2008). With the addition of 
statutes in Alabama, Alaska, and South Carolina, this number has now risen 
to forty-eight. See infra note 21. Of these forty-eight, approximately thirty al-
low defendants who pleaded guilty to request postconviction DNA testing. See 
Garrtt, supra, at 1680–81, 1680 n.238 (explaining that sixteen states require 
that “the defendant have disputed identity and have claimed innocence 
at . . . trial” and that additionally, New York disallows DNA testing from some 
guilty plea cases, and Utah impliedly requires that a defendant have previous-
ly advanced a theory of innocence at trial). Approximately fifteen statutes cur-
rently deny DNA testing to defendants who pleaded guilty. See ALA. CODE 
§ 15-18-200 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (allowing testing only in capital cases and 
only where “forensic DNA testing was not performed on the case at the time of 
the initial trial”); ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010) (allowing DNA testing only 
where “applicant did not admit or concede guilt under oath” but allowing a 
court to “waive this requirement in the interest of justice”); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-112-202(6)(A) (2006) (allowing a motion for DNA testing where “[t]he per-
son making a motion under this section identifies a theory of defense 
that . . . [i]s not inconsistent with an affirmative defense presented at the trial 
of the offense being challenged”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2007) (allow-
ing a motion where “[t]he movant presents a prima facie case that identity was 
an issue in the trial”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 116-3(b)(1) (West 2008) 
(allowing a defendant’s motion where “identity was the issue in the trial which 
resulted in his [or her] conviction”); 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 2138(4)(D) (2003) (requiring a court to order DNA analysis if “[t]he identity 
of the person as the perpetrator of the crime that resulted in the conviction 
was at issue during the person’s trial”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 770.16(4)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2011) (requiring a court to order DNA testing 
where the defendant establishes that “[t]he identity of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime was at issue during his trial”); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 590.01 (West 2010) (requiring defendant to make a prima facie case that 
“identity was an issue in the trial”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035(2)(4) (West 
2002) (requiring the motion to include an oath that “[i]dentity was an issue in 
the trial”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney 2005) (requiring 
the court to grant the motion for DNA testing of evidence if “a DNA test had 
been conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted in the 
trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant”); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 29-32.1-15 (2006) (requiring person making the motion to present a prima 
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ing the legal profession,15 and has provoked a welcome discus-
sion on the role of the prosecutor in preventing wrongful con-
victions.16 Indeed, the right to DNA testing already represents 
the greatest advance in criminal justice since Gideon and Mi-
randa,17 but, just as occurred with these other transformative 
rights, the force of the right is at risk of diminishing. The rea-
sons for the erosion of Miranda and Gideon are complex and 
 
facie case that “[i]dentity was an issue in the trial”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.74(C)(2)(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2010) (allowing a court to accept an applica-
tion for testing only if “[t]he court determines that, at the trial stage in the 
case . . . the identity of the person who committed the offense was an issue”); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1 (West 2007) (requiring a motion to show 
that “identity of . . . the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings”); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a) (West 2006) (allowing a court to order 
testing only where “identity was or is an issue in the case”); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-9-301(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring an allegation that “states a the-
ory of defense, not inconsistent with theories previously asserted at trial”). 
Out of the sixteen states originally identified by Garrett as requiring identity 
to be an issue at trial, four of the states additionally appear to allow defend-
ants who pleaded guilty to request DNA testing. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4902(c)(1), (d) (2004) (allowing a defendant’s petition where “[i]dentity was an 
issue in the trial which resulted in his conviction” but also allowing “[a] peti-
tioner who pleaded guilty in the underlying case” to file a DNA-testing peti-
tion); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(2)(b), (d) (West 2009) (requiring a defendant, in 
making a motion to state “[t]he facts of the underlying case, as proven at trial 
or admitted to during a guilty plea proceeding” and “[w]hether identity was at 
issue or contested by the defendant” (emphasis added)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
1A-2(C)(5) (West 2003) (requiring petitioner to show that “identity was an is-
sue in his case or that if the DNA testing he is requesting had been performed 
prior to his conviction and the results had been exculpatory, there is a reason-
able probability that the petitioner would not have pled guilty or been found 
guilty” (emphasis added)); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.692, 138.694 
(West2003) (only requiring identity to be at issue for counsel appointment).  
 15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g), (h) (2011) (requiring 
prosecutors to investigate and seek to remedy wrongful convictions when suf-
ficient evidence becomes available). As of January 2011, five states had adopt-
ed the new rules in some form, and eleven jurisdictions were studying them. 
AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF E S S I O NA L CONDUCT RULE 3.8(G) AND (H) (2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/3_8_ 
g_h.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2119, 2132 (2010) (discussing prosecutors’ role in preventing wrongful 
convictions); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preach-
ing to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 
37 (2009) (observing that a “key variable . . . in the ability of a criminal de-
fendant to have a chance for success on a post-conviction claim of innocence 
often lies in the nature of the prosecutor’s response”). 
 17. See David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-
Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2010) (observing that ex-
onerations, “made possible largely because of new DNA technology, constitute 
the most dramatic story in American criminal law over the past two decades”). 
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well-documented, but in short, almost as soon as the rights 
were announced, police, prosecutors, legislatures, and courts 
began to hollow them out. Police sometimes engage in outright 
trickery, wearing down defendants with questioning and lies.18 
Legislatures, on the other hand, provide minimal funding for 
public defense, forcing defenders to take on unrealistic case 
burdens.19 There is a danger that, as the novelty of DNA testing 
wears off—both for actors within the justice system and the 
general public—the right to DNA testing will follow the same 
path as the rights announced in Miranda and Gideon. This Ar-
ticle focuses on one way in which this has already begun. 
In the past sixteen years20 forty-eight states,21 the District 
of Columbia,22 and the federal government23 have created statu-
tory rights to DNA preservation, access, and testing.24 These 
statutory rights are particularly important in light of the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in District Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, which rejected a substantive due process right to DNA 
testing.25 Some prosecutors, however, have found a way around 
them. Through plea bargaining, these prosecutors have ob-
 
 18. Cf. Kruse, supra note 1 (addressing the Miranda right’s erosion and 
how “interrogators have worked their techniques around its requirements”). 
 19. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, AMERICA’S CON-
TINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE iv (2004), available at 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defen
dants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam
.pdf (describing testimony from thirty-two expert witnesses on indigent de-
fense and concluding that “thousands of persons are processed through Ameri-
ca’s courts each year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does 
not have the time, resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effec-
tive representation” and that “[t]he fundamental right to a lawyer that Ameri-
cans assume appl[ies] to everyone accused of criminal conduct effectively does 
not exist in practice for countless people across the United States”).  
 20. New York enacted the first post conviction DNA-testing statute in 
1994. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 1722. 
 21. See id. (describing how forty-five states provided a right to 
postconviction DNA testing in 2008). The Innocence Project in 2011 identified 
a total of forty-eight; Alabama, Alaska, and Mississippi have passed testing 
statutes since the publication of Garrett’s article. Access to Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php# ( last visited Nov. 30, 
2011); see ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 12.73.010 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2010).  
 22. D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131 to 33 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 23. Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2006). 
 24. The scope of these rights varies substantially. See generally Garrett, 
supra note 14, at 1675–82 (discussing differences among the various state 
statutes).  
 25. 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009). 
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tained waivers of the right to DNA testing and/or the preserva-
tion of DNA evidence.26 This Article collectively refers to these 
waivers as DNA waivers. 
The number of DNA waivers obtained by state and federal 
prosecutors is unclear, but at the federal level, they have been 
sought by a number of United States Attorneys’ offices during 
the administrations of the second President Bush and Presi-
dent Obama.27 The federal statute that grants certain defend-
ants access to DNA evidence expressly recognizes the possibil-
ity of defendants’ waiving this statutory right by providing that 
the waiver must be knowing and voluntary.28 A 2004 Depart-
ment of Justice memorandum directed federal prosecutors to 
elicit waivers of these statutory DNA-testing rights from de-
fendants,29 and, until 2010, some federal districts used a stand-
ardized plea agreement that contained DNA waiver language.30 
In late 2010, recognizing the inconsistency and other potential 
pitfalls of the practice, Attorney General Eric Holder discour-
aged prosecutors from including DNA waivers in plea bargains 
unless exceptional circumstances suggest that waiver is merit-
ed.31 Policy could change with future administrations, and the 
memorandum is not binding on state prosecutors. While there 
is reason to think that the idea has occurred to state prosecu-
tors,32 the evidence suggests they are not yet widely obtaining 
these waivers.33 It is impossible to say with any certainty 
whether that will change, but any practice that limits challeng-
es to prosecutors’ hard-earned convictions while simultaneously 
trimming expenditures is likely to have strong appeal.34  
Building from the literature on waivers of rights in other 
plea bargain contexts, this Article argues that courts are likely 
to deem DNA waivers generally enforceable, and that while 
there are valid concerns underlying their use, they are, on the 
 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 55–63. 
 27. The Obama Administration has moved away from the use of DNA 
waivers. See infra text accompanying note 31.  
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a). 
 29. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to all Fed. 
Prosecutors 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ag-memo 
-dna-waivers111810.pdf (describing the 2004 memorandum). 
 30. Id. at 2.  
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 66–70.  
 33. Justice Department Stops Policy on DNA Waivers, NPR (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/18/131423969/justice-to-stop-forcing-dna-waivers.  
 34. See infra text accompanying note 316. 
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whole, deeply problematic. Further, waivers have a serious po-
tential for misuse, as they could conceal failures to disclose ex-
culpatory material, and other misconduct. Waivers also create 
perverse incentives for the vast majority of generally ethical 
prosecutors. With an assurance that a case will not be chal-
lenged with the most definitive available evidence, prosecutors 
may be less scrupulous in their investigation of a case and more 
eager to quickly dispose of it through a plea bargain.35 Finally, 
if DNA waivers are a routine component of plea bargaining, the 
commitment to innocence motivating the approximately thirty 
state statutes that currently grant access to DNA testing to de-
fendants who have pleaded guilty36—individuals who account 
for the great majority of recent convictions37—will be substan-
tially undermined. 
Set against these clear risks, there are, arguably, signifi-
cant gains to be achieved through the use of DNA waivers. 
DNA waivers may well lead to more meaningful guilty pleas 
and reduce the number of unmeritorious testing claims, which 
financially burden the system and psychologically burden vic-
tims and their families.38 Less obviously, prosecutorial demands 
for DNA waivers could lead some innocent defendants to insist 
on trial, and, perhaps, slightly increase the information availa-
ble to prosecutors at the plea bargaining stage; innocent de-
fendants who would otherwise sign a guilty plea might balk at 
the waiver,39 thus signaling innocence, while guilty defendants 
may signal their guilt by more readily signing away their test-
ing and preservation rights. Ultimately, however, the Article 
concludes that the costs of using DNA waivers likely outweigh 
their benefits. 
 
 35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 183, 312 (describing a prose-
cutor’s preference for an appeal waiver and one court’s denial of an appeal 
waiver based on the fear that waivers insulate prosecutorial errors from  
review). 
 36. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 37. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism 
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658 (2010) 
(“Today, guilty pleas resolve 95 percent of adjudicated cases, and most of these 
result from plea bargains.”). 
 38. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing 
Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 
268–69 (2008).  
 39. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1384 (2003) (discussing the reasons innocent defend-
ants plead guilty). 
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This Article will evaluate the scope of DNA waivers, 
whether and under what circumstances the waivers will be up-
held, and the justifications behind their use. Part I identifies 
the practice of prosecutors’ use of DNA waivers in plea bargain-
ing. Part II addresses whether these waivers are enforceable, 
with a particular focus on the Supreme Court’s recent criminal 
waiver jurisprudence, and Part III argues that despite the like-
ly validity of DNA waivers in many jurisdictions (although 
there may be some disagreement about how “knowing” a waiver 
must be), they are nonetheless problematic. 
I.  DNA TESTING WAIVERS: PRESENT AND FUTURE   
DNA waivers are likely of minor import if they are used in-
frequently, although even one waiver signed by an innocent de-
fendant would be deeply troubling. The qualitative empirical 
evidence suggests, however, that waivers have been pursued by 
prosecutors in a number of populous federal districts, and al-
though no court has directly addressed their validity, appeals of 
these past waivers are likely. This Part introduces the prob-
lems underlying DNA waivers, identifies the past use of DNA 
waivers, and predicts future trends, suggesting that use at the 
state level could potentially expand. 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WAIVER PROBLEM 
Despite stubborn perceptions to the contrary,40 innocent de-
fendants plead guilty.41 Eight percent of the wrongfully convict-
ed defendants exonerated by DNA initially entered guilty 
 
 40. See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemean-
or Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 95–
96 (1977) (describing a “presumption . . . that innocent defendants will in fact 
contest charges lodged against them” but describing why “[i]nnocent defend-
ants may nonetheless offer pleas rather than contest their guilt at trial”); Eri-
ca Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 950 
(2008) (describing “faulty assumptions that . . . factually innocent defendants 
will not plead guilty”).  
 41. Barkai, supra note 40, at 97; Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the 
Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 261 (2009), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2009/Bowers.pdf; Russell D. Covey, 
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 1237, 1239 (2008); cf. Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclo-
sure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 656 (2007) (ob-
serving “that an unknown but likely troubling number of defendants pleading 
guilty probably” lack the knowledge of whether they are guilty or not); 
Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1982 (noting that “some innocents will accept the 
relatively high offer, despite substantial probabilities for acquittal at trial”).  
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pleas,42 and the strong incentives that push some innocent de-
fendants to plead guilty remain, suggesting that this trend may 
continue.43 As discussed more thoroughly in Part III, many in-
nocent defendants—in part due to their innocence—often lack 
crucial information about a case44 and may have trouble re-
sponding to prosecutorial claims of available implicating evi-
dence. 
Even in the absence of guilty pleas by innocents, pleas that 
deny access to DNA evidence and allow for its destruction have 
troublesome societal effects. They reflect a criminal justice sys-
tem grounded in convenience, not truth.45 DNA waivers also 
cover up prosecutorial misconduct and reduce incentives for 
prosecutors to thoroughly examine the accuracy of convictions,46 
prevent the identification of the real perpetrators of crimes,47 
weaken the powerful legislative commitment to factual inno-
cence,48 and incentivize guilty defendants to loudly proclaim in-
nocence49—thus diluting true innocence claims. The systemic 
effects alone justify a searching investigation of the practice.  
 
 42. See infra text accompanying note 293; cf. Samuel R. Gross et al., Ex-
onerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 523, 536 (2005) (in a study that predated the Innocence Project fig-
ures, finding that less than six percent of wrongful convictions for rape and 
murder arose from guilty pleas, whereas guilty pleas led to a higher percent-
age of wrongful drug convictions). 
 43. See, e.g., Barkai, supra note 40, at 96–97 (providing eight factors that 
may push an innocent defendant to plead guilty, including, among others, the 
“potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against him,” “feelings of 
hopelessness, powerlessness, or despair when faced with the power of the 
state,” and “ignorance”); cf. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1117, 1119–20, 1132 (2008) (arguing in favor of plea bargains for inno-
cent defendants and noting the frequency of guilty pleas by these defendants: 
the “best resolution” for the “typical” innocent defendant—a “recidivist facing 
petty charges”—“is generally a quick plea in exchange for a light, bargained-
for sentence;” the “costs of proceeding to trial often dwarf plea prices”). 
 44. See Hashimoto, supra note 40, at 951 (describing how “[i]nnocent de-
fendants . . . cannot accurately evaluate the strength of the case against 
them”); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Pro-
cess, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 971 (1989) (describing informational problems 
faced by defendants generally, including “defects in perception or awareness,” 
“defects in memory, in which the defendant cannot remember information crit-
ical to liability,” and “defects in a defendant’s expertise in resolving factual is-
sues critical to liability”).  
 45. See infra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.  
 46. See infra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. 
 47. See infra notes 328–31 and accompanying text.  
 48. See infra notes 321–26 and accompanying text.  
 49. See infra notes 331–32 and accompanying text.  
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B. RECENT USE OF DNA WAIVERS  
Although there has been little scholarship on DNA waiv-
ers,50 numerous United States Attorneys’ offices have used 
them for roughly the last five years.51 Like many states, the 
federal government allows certain defendants to request DNA 
testing and to use the results of this testing to bring post-
conviction innocence claims. The Innocence Protection Act of 
2004 provides: 
Upon a written motion by an individual under a sentence of impris-
onment or death pursuant to a conviction for a Federal offense (re-
ferred to in this section as the “applicant”), the court that entered the 
judgment of conviction shall order DNA testing of specific evidence 
[after having made prerequisite findings].52 
Prior to the Act’s passage, language allowing the right to 
be waived was added, apparently at the request of Republican 
senators:53 before granting DNA testing in a federal case, a 
court must find that the defendant did not “knowingly and vol-
untarily waive the right to request DNA testing of that evi-
dence in a court proceeding after the date of enactment of the 
Innocence Protection Act of 2004.”54 After the Act passed de-
spite the Bush Administration’s opposition, the Justice De-
 
 50. Several scholars have pointed to the existence of induced DNA waiv-
ers in passing, and all have relied upon newspaper articles to support this 
claim; none have specified whether they believe the practice occurs at the fed-
eral or state level. Seth F. Kreimer and David Rudovsky directly observe that 
“[p]rosecutors have attempted to induce defendants to waive their rights to 
the maintenance of DNA evidence . . . .” Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, 
Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Test-
ing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2002). Cynthia E. Jones, in turn, notes that 
“in an effort to preclude post-conviction DNA testing requests, a prosecutor’s 
office recently began trying to require defendants to waive the preservation of 
biological evidence as a prerequisite of getting a favorable plea offer.” Cynthia 
E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological 
Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 
1269 (2005). Aviva Orenstein also refers to the practice in passing. See Aviva 
Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in 
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 409 n.42 
(2011) (“Professor Brandon Garrett rightfully observed that the policy of re-
quiring waivers of future DNA testing as part of plea bargains in federal court 
sends ‘a terrible message: that federal prosecutors take a dim view of truth 
telling.’” (citing Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. to Review Bush Policy on DNA 
Test Waivers, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1)).  
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 55–63. 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2006).  
 53. Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. to Review Bush Policy on DNA Test, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1. 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3)(A)(i). 
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partment “sent a secret memo to the nation’s 94 U.S. 
[A]ttorney’s offices urging them to use the waivers.”55 
Although it is unclear exactly how many federal plea 
agreements include DNA waivers, Department of Justice doc-
uments suggest that prosecutors in several jurisdictions have 
sought numerous waivers since 2004. A 2010 Department of 
Justice memorandum notes that, as a result of the 2004 memo-
randum, “[s]ome districts use a standard plea agreement that 
contains an [Innocence Protection Act] waiver provision” (a 
provision foregoing future rights to DNA testing).56 These waiv-
ers both preclude testing of the evidence and allow for its de-
struction. A standard plea agreement from the District of Co-
lumbia, for example, reads: 
By entering this plea of guilty, your client waives any and all right 
your client may have, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3600 [the federal Inno-
cence Protection Act], to require DNA testing of any physical evidence 
in the possession of the Government. Your client fully understands 
that, as a result of this waiver, any physical evidence in this case will 
not be preserved by the Government and will therefore not be availa-
ble for DNA testing in the future.57 
Nine other plea agreements from the District of Columbia, 
culled from a small sample, include the same waiver lan-
guage,58 as does a plea offer from the District of Maryland.59 
DNA waivers from the Southern and Northern Districts of Illi-
nois contain nearly identical language, which surrenders all fu-
ture rights to DNA testing and preservation.60 Other federal 
 
 55. Markon, supra note 53, at A7.  
 56. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 29, at 2. 
 57. Letter from Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, to William M. Sullivan, Jr. § 13 (Apr. 19, 2010) (on file with author).  
 58. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Jones, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK 
(D.D.C. July 14, 2008); Plea Agreement § 16, United States v. White, No. 1:08-
cr-00044-RCL (D.D.C. May 1, 2008); Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. 
Bruening, No. 1:07-cr-314-RBW (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2008); Plea Agreement § 22, 
United States v. Miller, No. 1:06-cr-289-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007); Plea 
Agreement § 20, United States v. Hamilton, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK(1) (D.D.C. 
Jan. 30, 2007); Plea Agreement § 19, United States v. Montalvo, No. 1:06-cr-
201-GK (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2006); Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. Waziry, 
No. 1:06-cr-342-ESH (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2006); Plea Agreement § 20, United 
States v. Wills, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK(2) (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2006); Letter from 
Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Tuohey and William E. 
Lawler, III § 14 (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding United States v. 
Tejada, No. 09-MJ-77 (D.D.C.)).  
 59. Letter from Stuart M. Goldberg & Michael J. Leotta, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Joshua G. Berman, Esq. § 11 (Apr. 4, 2008) (on file with author).  
 60. Plea Agreement §§ 11, 12, United States v. McPike, No. 3:05-cr-30069-
WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005) (providing that the defendant “consents to the de-
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waivers do not directly grant the right to evidence destruction 
but suggest that destruction will occur. A waiver from the Dis-
trict of Connecticut, for example, provides in part: 
The defendant understands his right to have all the physical evidence 
in this case tested for DNA, has discussed this right with his counsel, 
and knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to have such DNA 
testing performed on the physical evidence in this case. Defendant 
understands that, because he is waiving this right, the physical evi-
dence in this case will likely be destroyed or will otherwise be una-
vailable for DNA testing in the future.61 
DNA waivers from the Eastern District of Virginia similar-
ly contain provisions that specifically bar access to future DNA 
evidence, but their language does not imply destruction: 
The defendant also understands that Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 3600 affords a defendant the right to request DNA testing of 
evidence after conviction. Nonetheless, the defendant knowingly 
waives that right. The defendant further understands that this waiv-
er applies to DNA testing of any items of evidence in this case that 
could be subjected to DNA testing, and that the waiver forecloses any 
opportunity to have evidence submitted for DNA testing in this case 
or in any post-conviction proceeding for any purpose, including to 
support a claim of innocence to the charges admitted in this plea 
agreement.62 
Other federal plea bargains contain a range of similar lan-
guage—some more detailed in its description of its waiver, and 
some more specific as to the destruction of the evidence.63 
 
struction of all items of physical evidence seized in this case” and that “he will 
never have another opportunity to have the evidence in this case submitted for 
DNA testing,” among other details); Plea Agreement § 21, United States v. 
Headley, No. 09 CR 830-3 (N.D. Ill. undated) (on file with author). 
 61. Letter from Nora R. Dannehy & Ann M. Nevins, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Arnold Kriss (Feb. 11, 2010) (on file with author) (regarding plea agreement 
in United States v. Natera, No. 3:09CR221(JCH)(HBF) (D. Conn. 2010)). 
 62. E.g., Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Almanza, No. l:09cr430 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Jin, No. 09-CR-
249 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Eaves, No. 
1:07cr140 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2007); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. 
Gomez, No. l:07cr125 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2007) (on file with author). 
 63. See, e.g., Plea Agreement § 12, United States v. Li, No. 2:09-cr-00067-
SJO (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) (specifically listing the available evidence and 
surrendering the right to testing of DNA evidence); Plea Agreement § VII.D, 
United States v. Ortega, No. 2:09-CR-00517 GEB (E.D. Cal. undated) (on file 
with author) ( listing the specific items of evidence available in the case, stat-
ing that the “defendant knowingly and voluntarily gives up [the] right [to 
DNA testing] with respect to both the specific items listed above and any other 
items of evidence there may be in this case that might be amenable to DNA 
testing,” and stating that the defendant will “never have another opportunity 
to have the evidence in this case submitted for DNA testing”). 
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In the short term, DNA waivers will likely diminish quick-
ly at the federal level due to a recently announced policy dis-
couraging the practice. In November 2010, Attorney General 
Holder announced to all federal prosecutors that, in a revision 
to the 2004 policy, “the Department should not, as a matter of 
general policy, seek to foreclose the possibility of postconviction 
DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 
U.S.C. § 3600, as part of plea agreements with defendants.”64 
Instead, “waivers of DNA testing pursuant to the Innocence 
Protection Act (IPA) [must] be sought or accepted by federal 
prosecutors only under exceptional circumstances.”65 
At the state level, the use of DNA waivers is not as clear. 
Although a representative of the National District Attorneys 
Association has decried the practice,66 evidence of state practic-
es remains difficult to obtain,67 and an informal survey pro-
duced few responses at the state level.68 There is some evidence 
that the district attorney in Williamson County, Texas—home 
to approximately 400,000 people69—has advised his peers to in-
sert permission to destroy DNA evidence into plea bargains be-
cause “innocence trumps everything.”70 At present, however, 
the available evidence suggests that DNA waivers are not 
commonly used at the state level. 
C. POTENTIAL FUTURE TRENDS 
Although prosecutors’ use of DNA waivers will at least 
temporarily decline at the federal level, there is, of course, no 
guarantee that future Attorneys General will not reinstate a 
pro-waiver policy. Moreover, as prosecutors’ offices around the 
country deal with budget constraints, there will be a tempta-
 
 64. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 29.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Markon, supra note 53, at A7 (“Joshua Marquis, who sits on the exec-
utive committee of the National District Attorneys Association, said he’s never 
heard of DNA waivers in state court and that the organization opposes the 
concept. ‘I think it’s important to always leave the door open for actual proof of 
innocence,’ he said.”). 
 67. Cf. Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (re-
lying upon survey for data on habeas waivers). 
 68. Survey of Select Defense Attorneys and State Prosecutors (Oct. 2010 
to Feb. 2011) (on file with author).  
 69. Williamson County, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts 
.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48491.html ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 70. DAs Dislike Criticisms of DNA Destruction Practices, GRITS FOR 
BREAKFAST (Feb. 27, 2007), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2007/02/das 
-dislike-criticisms-of-dna.html. 
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tion to use DNA waivers to cut costs. A useful historical analo-
gy is found in the expansion of appeal and habeas waivers in 
plea agreements. As Nancy King and Michael O’Neill explain, 
the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 198471 and its new 
sentencing guidelines created a climate of appeal, wherein 
“[a]ppellate review of sentencing emerged as the primary en-
forcement mechanism for sentencing reform in federal courts as 
well as in the courts of more than a dozen states.”72 Following 
the Reform Act, prosecutors and criminal defendants argued on 
appeal that sentences were too low or high, and judges inter-
preted and defined the scope of the guidelines.73 With the rise of 
the appeal, however, quickly came practices that began to un-
dermine its usefulness. In 1995, prosecutors began entering 
agreements with defendants “to drop or not to add a charge, so 
long as the defendant agreed in return to waive everything in-
cluding the right to appeal.”74 These waivers served to preserve 
prosecutorial resources. As one prosecutor told King and 
O’Neill: “We were spending attorney resources on appeals [in 
cases that] we eventually won. We have in the office only gener-
alists; our trial attorneys do their own appellate briefs. A couple 
big appeals per year can hurt your indictment productivity.”75 
The use of the waivers quickly spread among the circuits, 
and within the same year, six circuits (in addition to the three 
that had already validated appeal waivers) affirmed the validi-
ty of the practice.76 Prosecutors’ affinity for waivers was conta-
gious. A Washington memorandum soon directed prosecutors to 
“consider whether the employment of appeal waivers would be 
a ‘useful addition’ in their districts,”77 and by 1999, Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been amended to 
specifically recognize appeal waivers; it required judges accept-
ing plea agreements to warn defendants in court that they were 
giving up their right to appeal.78 Following the amendment and 
further favorable court decisions, “defense attorneys in districts 
 
 71.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 72. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 215 (2005).  
 73. Id. at 214–15.  
 74. Id. at 220.  
 75. Id. at 221. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Cf. United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 13–14 (1st Cir. 
2008) (applying Rule 11 to an appeal waiver). 
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where appeal waivers were still uncommon found waivers pro-
posed as part of every plea agreement.”79 Waivers of habeas 
rights experienced a similar trajectory. A survey conducted in 
2006 revealed that twenty-seven out of thirty-five federal dis-
tricts and ten out of nineteen states surveyed used habeas 
waivers.80 
As indicated by the pervasiveness of DNA waivers in cer-
tain United States Attorneys’ offices in recent years, the history 
of the expansion of the use of appeal and habeas waivers, and 
the likelihood that prosecutors’ offices around the country will 
be faced with difficult budget choices in the coming years, it is 
likely that at least some prosecutors will continue to seek DNA 
waivers. It is therefore important to understand the legal and 
practical implications of their use.81 The following Part explores 
the validity of DNA waivers obtained in a variety of factual 
scenarios, analogizing from court decisions and legal literature 
addressing appeal and habeas waivers. 
II.  VALIDITY AND SCOPE OF DNA WAIVERS   
As established in Part I, DNA waivers were at one point 
relatively common at the federal level and could become com-
mon again as leadership changes; little would prevent Attorney 
General Holder or a future Attorney General from reversing 
the federal policy against DNA waivers tomorrow, or two years 
from now. Further, the history of appellate waivers in plea bar-
gains and their rapid expansion from the federal to the state 
level suggests that DNA waivers may follow the same path. On-
ly three states have banned the practice,82 and when prosecu-
tors have an opportunity to make their conviction more bullet-
proof while simultaneously preserving their budgets, there is a 
good chance that some of them will seize it. Given the im-
portance and potential prevalence of DNA waivers, this Part 
explores their validity. The discussion begins by addressing the 
 
 79. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 224. 
 80. Malani, supra note 67, at 8.  
 81. Even with the temporary pause in waivers at the federal level, for ex-
ample, courts will likely soon see legal challenges to the validity of existing 
waivers.  
 82. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. At least one state court 
has held that a waiver of the right “to withdraw a plea based on a claim of in-
nocence, any challenges to the underlying factual basis for the plea, any type 
of direct or collateral appeal” waived “any right to DNA testing of that evi-
dence or court action to pursue such tests.” State v. Bembenek, 724 N.W.2d 
685, 686 n.2, 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
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constitutionality of waivers under Osborne, and then moves to 
the broader principles of criminal waiver and the “knowing and 
voluntary” requirement. Finally, this Part considers how the 
principles explored will apply to different hypothetical DNA 
waiver scenarios and how criminal defendants will be able to 
challenge these waivers after the fact, if at all.  
A. WHETHER DNA WAIVERS ARE PER SE INVALID 
No court has yet determined whether criminal defendants 
may validly waive their right to DNA testing through plea bar-
gains,83 and only a limited number of states have addressed the 
question through legislation. California,84 West Virginia,85 and 
Wyoming86 have preemptively declared waivers of DNA testing 
rights in plea bargains (or generally) invalid. Colorado and 
South Dakota, on the other hand, follow the federal Innocence 
Protection Act by specifically allowing waivers of the “right to 
preservation of DNA evidence . . . at any stage of the proceed-
 
 83. Courts have, however, noted the existence of DNA waivers in address-
ing other issues. See, e.g., Smocks v. United States, Nos. 09-0635-CV-W-FJG; 
08-00108-01-CR-W-FJG, 2010 WL 1332011, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2010) (de-
scribing how an attorney explained to his client that he would be “waiving his 
constitutional rights, appellate and post-conviction rights . . . and the right to 
request DNA testing of any biological evidence which may have been obtained 
by law enforcement” in agreeing to a plea); Reese v. United States, Criminal 
No. 08-16, Civil No. 09-709, 2009 WL 3286903, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2009) 
(“[T]he written plea agreement required . . . [the defendant] to ‘acknowledge 
responsibility for the conduct charged’ . . . and waive former jeopardy or dou-
ble jeopardy claims, post-conviction DNA testing and the preservation of evi-
dence for same.”); United States v. Holliday, No. 5:08CR39-01, 2008 WL 
4700660, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 21, 2008) (explaining that at the plea hearing, 
“the United States reviewed the terms of the plea agreement, including, 
among other things, that the defendant was pleading guilty to Count 
One . . . and that he was waiving his appellate and post-conviction rights, his 
right to have a jury make factual determinations, and his right to raise the 
issue of DNA testing”); United States v. Akomah, No. 06CR1096(LAP), 2007 
WL 4245841, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2007) (noting that the lower court “spe-
cifically referred the defendant to a number of key provisions of the plea 
agreement-including . . . the waiver of the right to DNA testing—and the de-
fendant indicated that he recalled each of these terms being in the plea 
agreement”).  
 84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(m) (West 2011) (“Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the right to file a motion for postconviction DNA testing pro-
vided by this section is absolute and shall not be waived. This prohibition ap-
plies to, but is not limited to, a waiver that is given as part of an agreement 
resulting in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”). 
 85. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (m) (LexisNexis 2009) (providing lan-
guage nearly identical to that of the California code).  
 86. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-312(a) (2011) (providing language nearly 
identical to that of the California code).  
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ing,” provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary.87 Similarly, 
North Carolina dictates that the duty to preserve may only be 
waived in a court proceeding.88 
Despite the lack of cases addressing the issue directly, the 
weight of precedent in similar contexts suggests that, with lim-
ited exceptions, the waivers will be generally enforceable so 
long as they are knowing and voluntary. Criminal defendants 
have challenged a range of other waivers contained within plea 
bargains and have nearly always failed.89 Courts allow defend-
ants to give up a wide variety of core constitutional and statu-
tory rights in plea bargains, and it is unlikely that rights to 
postconviction DNA testing will receive different treatment. 
1. Osborne 
Because it is the key opinion on the right to DNA testing, 
the discussion of DNA waivers begins with District Attorney’s 
Office v. Osborne.90 The Court in Osborne held that there is no 
substantive due process right to DNA testing.91 The Court did, 
however, recognize that Osborne had a state-created “liberty 
interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence un-
der state law,” and that this right could “in some circumstanc-
es, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realiza-
 
 87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-1106(2) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-
1 (Supp. 2011) (“Upon a written motion by any person who has been convicted 
of a felony offense, the court that entered the judgment of conviction for the 
felony offense shall order DNA testing of specific evidence if the court finds 
that all of the following apply: . . . the petitioner did not: (i) Knowingly and 
voluntarily waive the right to request DNA testing of that evidence in a court 
proceeding . . . .”). 
 88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (a)(5) (2009) (“The duty to preserve may 
not be waived knowingly and voluntarily by a defendant, without a court pro-
ceeding.”). The District of Columbia requires, under certain circumstances, a 
court to inform an accused that he may waive—prior to making a plea—both 
the right to independent DNA testing (where the state has already tested the 
evidence) and other general DNA testing where the biological evidence has not 
been tested, and to inform an accused of the potential evidentiary value of the 
DNA evidence and the consequences of waiver. If a defendant then waives the 
right to pre conviction testing, he is not eligible for post-conviction testing un-
less he is otherwise entitled to have the conviction set aside. D.C. CODE § 22-
4132(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 89. Cf. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904) (“When there is no 
constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an ac-
cused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy.”). 
 90. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). 
 91. Id. at 2322 (concluding “in the circumstances of this case, that there is 
no . . . substantive due process right”).  
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tion of the parent right.”92 The Court rejected extending the 
preconviction procedural due process framework to the 
postconviction context, holding that “the question is whether 
consideration of Osborne’s claim within the framework of the 
State’s procedures for postconviction relief ‘offends some prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or ‘transgresses any 
recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.’”93 
The question under Osborne, then, is whether allowing DNA 
waivers would cause a DNA testing procedure to fail this test. 
There is little doubt that it would not. As discussed in more de-
tail below, the Court has allowed many fundamental rights to 
be waived, not least the right to a trial;94 a different result is 
unlikely for the testing right. Moreover, in holding that Alas-
ka’s postconviction procedures passed this test, the Court noted 
that in order to access DNA evidence under Alaska law, that 
evidence must be, inter alia, “diligently pursued”;95 waiving the 
chance to test evidence is hardly diligent pursuit. Osborne pre-
sents no barrier to the enforceability of DNA waivers, so it is 
necessary to look to the Supreme Court’s criminal waiver  
jurisprudence.  
2. Mezzanatto and Hill 
Courts addressing waivers of rights in plea bargains begin 
with a “presumption of waivability”96 that extends even to the 
“most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”97 
The recent Supreme Court cases addressing this presumption 
merit a detailed review; these decisions, building upon a series 
of older waiver cases, clarify the test that will apply to the va-
lidity of DNA waivers. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Su-
preme Court observed that for a “broad array of constitutional 
and statutory provisions, [r]ather than deeming waiver pre-
sumptively unavailable absent some sort of express enabling 
 
 92. Id. at 2319 (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. at 2320 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 
(1992)). 
 94. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 831–
33 (2003) (contrasting the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions with the 
much more permissive doctrine of criminal waiver). 
 95. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320. The Court later observed that the testing 
Osborne sought had been available at trial “and the state court relied on that 
fact in denying him testing under Alaska law.” Id. at 2321. 
 96. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995). 
 97. Id. at 201.  
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clause, we instead have adhered to the opposite presumption.”98 
In Mezzanatto, undercover police agents caught the defendant 
selling drugs,99 and the prosecutor subsequently entered into 
plea negotiations with him, with an agreement that if he was 
not entirely truthful during the negotiations, his statements 
could be used as impeaching evidence at trial.100 Negotiations 
broke down when the defendant made inconsistent state-
ments,101 and at trial the prosecution cross-examined the de-
fendant using his inconsistent statements from the negotiation 
process.102 
On appeal, the issue was whether Mezzanatto could “waive 
the protection of the rules barring the use of plea negotiation 
statements for impeachment,”103 which the Ninth Circuit decid-
ed he could not, looking “to the broader context of the criminal 
justice system”104 and the role of plea bargains within this sys-
tem, and noting that “[t]o allow waiver of these rules would be 
contrary to all that Congress intended to achieve” and that al-
lowing waiver “could easily have a chilling effect on the entire 
plea bargaining process.”105 The court, in other words, focused 
on the systemic effects of waiver. In reversing the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis was “directly contrary” to the Court’s approach to 
waivers of many other statutory and constitutional rights.106 
The Court focused on its past decisions on waivability, noting 
that the “most fundamental protections afforded by the Consti-
tution” may be waived, including rights against double jeop-
ardy and self-incrimination and rights to jury trial, confronta-
tion, and counsel.107  
As the Court explained, an equal presumption of 
waivability applies to statutory rights “absent some affirmative 
 
 98. Id. at 200–01.  
 99. Id. at 197–98. 
 100. Id. at 198. 
 101. Id. at 199. 
 102. Id. 
 103. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993), 
(discussing FED. R. EVID. 410 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)) rev’d 513 U.S. 196 
(1995)). 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 1455.  
 106. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200. 
 107. Id. at 201 (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (waiver of 
double jeopardy); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (waiver of 
rights against “compulsory self-incrimination” and rights to jury trial and con-
frontation); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (right to counsel)).  
 972 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:952 
 
indication of Congress’s intent to preclude waiver” or an ex-
press waiver provision that suggested “that Congress intended 
to occupy the field and to preclude waiver under other, unstat-
ed circumstances.”108 The Court then cited to an array of evi-
dentiary rules that had been validly waived through plea 
agreements in the past,109 and it determined that, in light of the 
“background presumption” in favor of waivability, Mezzanatto 
had the burden of “identifying some affirmative basis for con-
cluding that the plea-statement Rules depart from the pre-
sumption.”110 Mezzanatto put forth three bases for denying 
waivability, arguing that rules that “guarantee . . . fair proce-
dure” may not be waived,111 that waiver was “fundamentally in-
consistent” with the goals of the rules (to encourage voluntary 
settlement),112 and that more generally, “waiver agreements 
should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial over-
reaching and abuse.”113 The Court disagreed with all three of 
these arguments, establishing some clear principles for future 
waiver decisions.114  
With respect to concerns about waivers denying fair proce-
dures, the Court conceded that some waivers may occasionally 
go too far. Those waivers that risk “irreparably ‘discredit[ing] 
the federal courts’”115 by, for example, allowing “‘trial by 12 
orangutans’”116 or conflicted counsel,117 are likely unenforceable. 
In defining the types of waivers that tend to overly detract from 
fair procedures and thus could cause “institutional harm to the 
federal courts,”118 the Court focused on the “truth-seeking func-
tion of trials” (a function that might be substantially affected 
by a jury of orangutans or a conflicted attorney).119 It concluded 
that waiver in Mezzanatto’s case “enhances the truth-seeking 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 202 (citing waivers admitting hearsay and to admit documen-
tary and other evidence).  
 110. Id. at 203–04.  
 111. Id. at 204. 
 112. Id. at 206. 
 113. Id. at 209. 
 114. Id. at 204–09. 
 115. Id. at 204 (alteration in original) (citing 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 
207–08 (1977)). 
 116. Id. (citing United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 117. Id. (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988)). 
 118. Id. at 205. 
 119. Id. at 204. 
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function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts”120 
because it makes the jury aware of inconsistent statements by 
the testifying defendant.121 
Second, addressing Mezzanatto’s concern that waiver of 
the rules subverted the rules’ goals by discouraging voluntary 
settlement—a concern also expressed by the Ninth Circuit122—
the Court refused to decide whether or when “public policy” 
considerations such as chilling the plea bargaining process 
could ever justify overriding the “presumption of waivability.”123 
Instead, it determined that, in any case, waiver of the right at 
issue might even encourage plea bargaining, and relatedly, that 
prohibiting waiver might cause prosecutors to “decline to enter 
into cooperation discussions in the first place.”124 
Finally, addressing the contention that waiver agreements 
generally should be “forbidden” due to potential prosecutorial 
abuse, the Court relied on its decision in Newton v. Rumery.125 
In Newton, the Court considered whether all agreements in 
which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for dismissal of pending crim-
inal charges were void as against public policy because they 
could lead to trumped up charges and suppressed evidence.126 
Rejecting a per se rule (while acknowledging that some agree-
ments may not be informed and voluntary), a plurality of the 
Court stated that “the mere opportunity to act improperly does 
not compel an assumption that all—or even a significant num-
ber of—release-dismissal agreements stem from prosecutor[ial 
misconduct.]”127 Building on Newton, the Mezzanatto Court held 
that “[t]he mere potential for abuse of prosecutorial bargaining 
power is an insufficient basis for foreclosing negotiation alto-
gether.”128 Rather, the Court determined that defendants could 
counter abuse in individual cases (by arguing that there was 
coercion in inducing the waiver agreement), and that “absent 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 205.  
 122. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 123. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 206–07. 
 124. Id. at 206. 
 125. Id. at 210 (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)). 
 126. The Court answered “this question by reference to traditional com-
mon-law principles, as [it had] resolved other questions about the principles 
governing § 1983 actions.” Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 
(1987). 
 127. Id. at 397. 
 128. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210. 
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some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered in-
to unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the ex-
clusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and 
enforceable.”129 
The Court in New York v. Hill further elaborated upon this 
waiver test.130 In Hill, the respondent was in custody in Ohio, 
and officials in New York wished to charge him.131 The officials 
therefore filed a detainer under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers (IAD), which creates “procedures for resolution of 
one State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another 
State”132 and requires a timely trial133 after a defendant has 
made a “request for a final disposition.”134 During a scheduling 
hearing in open court, the prosecutor requested a later trial 
date (as permitted by the IAD), and Hill’s attorney stated that 
a trial date (which happened to be beyond the required time pe-
riod under the IAD) would be “fine.”135 Hill moved to dismiss 
the indictment,136 arguing a lack of timeliness, and the trial 
court denied his request, citing Hill’s counsel’s waiver of timely 
trial.137 The New York Court of Appeals ultimately ordered the 
indictment to be dismissed on the grounds that Hill had not 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Although the waiver agreed to in Hill was not part of a plea agree-
ment, this distinction does not appear to matter after Mezzanatto, at least in 
dicta. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000). In a footnote in Mezzanatto, the Court 
noted that Mezzanatto argued that pretrial agreements to waive were unlike 
waiver agreements made while the “case is in progress.” The Court noted: 
While it may be true that extrajudicial contracts made prior to litiga-
tion trigger closer judicial scrutiny than stipulations made within the 
context of litigation there is nothing extrajudicial about the waiver 
agreement at issue here. The agreement was made in the course of a 
plea discussion aimed at resolving the specific criminal case that was 
“in progress” against respondent. 
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203 n.3 (citing 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH 
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207–08 
(1977)). 
 131. Hill, 528 U.S. at 112.  
 132. Id. at 111 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 580.20 (McKinney 1995); UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11A 
U.L.A. 48 (1995)). 
 133. Id. at 112 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20, Art. III(a) 
(McKinney 1995)). 
 134. Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20, Art. III(a) (McKinney 
1995)). 
 135. Id. at 112–13.  
 136. Id. at 113.  
 137. Id.  
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waived his “speedy trial rights under the IAD.”138  
On appeal, the Supreme Court began by noting that the 
IAD statute does not include a waiver provision for the trial 
timing requirements, but emphasized the presumption of 
waivability laid out in Mezzanatto.139 Hill raised two objections 
to allowing waiver. First, he argued that “by explicitly provid-
ing for the grant of ‘good-cause continuances,’ the IAD seeks to 
limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that per-
mitting other extensions of the time period would override 
those limitations.”140 The Court took a more accommodating 
stance toward “policy” arguments than it had in Mezzanatto, 
acknowledging that “waiver is not appropriate when it is incon-
sistent with the provision creating the right sought to be se-
cured.”141 The Court emphasized, however, the high burden of 
proof faced by a defendant who argues that waiver is incon-
sistent with the instrument that is creating the right: as estab-
lished by Mezzanatto, the defendant must make an “affirmative 
indication of Congress’s intent to preclude waiver.”142 Because 
the “good-cause continuances” provided for in the IAD were not 
intended to address agreed-upon extensions, “the negative impli-
cation” was “certainly not clear enough” to meet this burden.143 
Second, Hill argued that “the IAD benefits not only the de-
fendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not 
waive society’s rights.”144 The Court again conceded that, as it 
had previously recognized, a “‘right conferred on a private par-
ty, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or re-
leased if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory poli-
cy.’”145 But the Court emphasized that “[i]t is not true that any 
private right that also benefits society cannot be waived.”146 Ra-
ther, it found that litigants within the system typically protect 
the public’s rights,147 and in the case of trials of already-
detained defendants under the IAD, the benefits of “prompt tri-
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 114.  
 140. Id. at 116. 
 141. Id. 
 142. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995); see Hill, 528 
U.S. at 116.  
 143. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)). 
 146. Id. at 117.  
 147. Id.  
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al” are less relevant.148 Besides, the Court noted, the public’s in-
terest in prompt trial, partially embodied within the IAD, was 
not “unalterable statutory policy.”149 
After finding the waiver of the IAD’s rights to a timely trial 
to be generally valid, the court lastly addressed what was re-
quired for Hill to waive the right in this particular case. The 
Court noted here that “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on 
the nature of the right at issue.”150 The Court observed, for ex-
ample, that a “defendant must personally make an informed 
waiver” of “certain fundamental rights,” including the right to 
counsel151 and the right to plead not guilty.152 It concluded that 
this analysis should not turn on a “hypertechnical distinction,” 
however, such as whether Hill had in fact made an “affirmative 
request” to waive his rights.153 The agreement by Hill’s counsel 
to a trial date inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits was 
enough to constitute a waiver, and the waiver was validly 
made.154 
Taken together, Hill and Mezzanatto pose a formidable 
hurdle for a criminal defendant seeking to argue that his rights 
are not waivable in the absence of a clear legislative statement 
to that effect. Mezzanatto emphasizes the presumption that de-
fendants may knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitu-
tional and statutory rights and notes only very narrow public 
policy and “court integrity” exceptions to this presumption.155 
Hill places a high bar on attempts to argue that a waiver un-
dermines the statutory right “sought to be secured”156—
reemphasizing that an “affirmative indication” against waiver 
must be found in the statute.157 Further, Hill makes clear that 
where a defendant argues that a waiver is generally detri-
mental to society at-large, and thus against public policy, the 
societal interest must likely be part of the statute’s “unaltera-
ble policy” to merit invalidation of a waiver.158 Finally, where a 
defendant challenges the particular means by which the waiver 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)).  
 150. Id. at 114. 
 151. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938)). 
 152. Id. (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966)). 
 153. Id. at 118. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
 156. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116.  
 157. Id. (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201).  
 158. Id. at 117.  
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was entered, the nature of the right matters: the more funda-
mental the right, the more procedure and voluntariness is re-
quired.159 As a result of the long chain of case law relied upon 
by the court, as well as the Hill and Mezzanatto decisions 
themselves, the Supreme Court is “decidedly inhospitable to 
the notion that any agreement by a criminal defendant to 
waive a right—either constitutional or statutory—could be pre-
sumptively against public policy.”160 
3. The Likely Validity of DNA Waivers 
Applying these principles to DNA waivers, federal courts 
are unlikely to accept arguments that they are invalid per se. 
The question of per se validity is more difficult, however, in the 
many states with postconviction DNA testing statutes that do 
not explicitly contemplate waiver of the testing right. 
a. Federal Courts  
Initially, a defendant opposing a DNA waiver in federal 
court could argue that Congress and the states, in granting 
DNA testing, did not intend for defendants to waive this test-
ing. This will be an extremely difficult task because, as previ-
ously noted, the Innocence Protection Act161 expressly antici-
pates DNA waivers.162 This fact will largely foreclose the 
otherwise promising argument, developed below,163 that Con-
gress could not have intended to allow waiver because waiver is 
inconsistent with the right being granted.164 
Nonetheless, a defendant could challenge DNA waivers on 
broader “public policy” grounds. First, he could argue from 
Mezzanatto that the waiver of DNA testing will discredit the 
federal courts.165 This argument is definitely plausible: as will 
 
 159. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 160. Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 127, 160 (1995).  
 161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3) (2006) (allowing DNA testing only where 
the defendant did not “knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to request 
DNA testing of that evidence in a court proceeding after the date of enactment 
of the Innocence Protection Act of 2004”). 
 162. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 163. See infra Part II.A.3.b. 
 164. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000). 
 165. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (quoting 21 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5039, 207–08 (1977)). 
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be addressed in greater detail below,166 allowing prosecutors to 
prevent potentially conclusive evidence of innocence from com-
ing to light will damage public confidence in the courts. And 
Mezzanatto emphasized that plea statements can be admitted 
as impeachment evidence at trial without “discrediting the fed-
eral courts” because impeaching evidence “enhances the truth-
seeking function of trials and will result in more accurate ver-
dicts.”167 But the Mezzanatto Court seemed leery of a “‘contract 
to deprive the court of relevant testimony,’”168 which is exactly 
analogous to the effect of a DNA waiver—particularly where 
the waiver also allows the destruction of evidence. Unfortunate-
ly, however, the Court’s interest in accuracy at trial has not ex-
tended to the pretrial period,169 and DNA waivers, while perhaps 
distasteful, are not as shocking as a jury of lower primates.170 
A defendant could also make a second public policy argu-
ment against DNA waivers—that DNA-testing statutes affect 
the public interest, and allowing waiver contravenes statutory 
policy. It is certainly true that society has an interest in test-
ing: beyond freeing the innocent, testing often leads to the ap-
prehension of the actual perpetrator.171 This interest could be 
thwarted by DNA waivers. But it may be difficult to say that 
waiver truly contravenes statutory policy in light of the fact 
that many testing statutes—mindful of the monetary and emo-
tional costs to disturbing finality—already impose meaningful, 
and sometimes insuperable, barriers to testing, including, inter 
alia, “guilty plea exclusions, custody requirements, due dili-
gence requirements, and requirements that the technology has 
changed since the time of trial.”172 Enforcing waivers is entirely 
consistent with this approach. 
 
 166. See infra notes 328–31 and accompanying text. 
 167. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204. 
 168. Id. (quoting Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 138, 142–43 (1933)); see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Re-
considered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2080–81 (2000) (arguing that the Brady right, as a 
structural right, “is simply not the defendant’s right to alienate” and that the 
“recognition that such ‘structural protections’ are inalienable can be found in 
cases cited by the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto”).  
 169. See infra notes 232–42 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204. 
 171. See, e.g., Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_ 
DNA_Exonerations.php ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“The true suspects and/or 
perpetrators have been identified in 124 of the DNA exoneration cases.”).  
 172. Garrett, supra note 14, at 1680.  
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Third, a defendant could argue that enforcing DNA waiv-
ers would create an unacceptable risk of police and prosecutori-
al misconduct, as waivers could be used to bar testing and dis-
pose of the evidence of a host of misdeeds. But despite the 
appeal of this approach, it is foreclosed by Mezzanatto and 
Rumery, which squarely hold that the mere potential for mis-
use is insufficient to render a waiver per se invalid.173 There 
are, in sum, strong public policy arguments to be made for op-
posing the use of waivers; these arguments will be considered 
at greater length below. Some state courts, if presented with 
the question, may be persuaded to hold DNA waivers generally 
unenforceable.174 The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to 
find these arguments sufficiently compelling to overcome its af-
finity for waiver, and particularly for waivers in plea  
agreements.  
The conclusion that federal courts are unlikely to generally 
invalidate DNA waivers is reinforced by the lower federal 
courts’ approach to the waiver of rights similar to the right to 
postconviction DNA testing and preservation: the right to ap-
peal and to seek postconviction review through habeas. These 
waivers, which are now commonplace, are analogous to DNA 
waivers because they limit a defendant’s right to a form of post-
plea review. And in all three cases—for habeas, appeal, and 
DNA waivers—a strong argument can be made that allowing 
waiver is against public policy because it is inconsistent with 
the purpose of the right itself (remedying error) and the poten-
tial for abuse by unscrupulous prosecutors seeking to cover up 
wrongdoing.175 Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the validity of these waivers, twelve circuit 
courts of appeals have upheld appeal waivers,176 and habeas 
waivers have “been accepted in all but one of the jurisdictions 
(Indiana) that have considered them.”177 In refusing to create a 
 
 173. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 
386, 397 (1987). 
 174. See infra notes 177, 183 and accompanying text (discussing states not 
allowing appeal and habeas waivers). 
 175. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.  
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 
2008); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990); see also FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (amended in 1999 to implicitly allow for appeal waivers, 
providing that “[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty . . . the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court” and must inform the defend-
ant of “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal 
or to collaterally attack the sentence,” among other rights surrendered). 
 177. Malani, supra note 67, at 12. The Supreme Court of Indiana held 
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blanket ban on appeal and habeas waivers, lower courts have 
relied on the same factors voiced in Mezzanatto and Hill. In 
United States v. Wiggins, one of the earliest decisions to ad-
dress waiver of the right to appeal,178 the Fourth Circuit made a 
typical observation: “[I]f defendants can waive fundamental 
constitutional rights such as the right to counsel, or the right to 
a jury trial, surely they are not precluded from waiving proce-
dural rights granted by statute.”179 
Similarly, courts have found appeal waivers to be generally 
justifiable on public policy grounds. In United States v. Teeter, 
the First Circuit concluded that public policy supports appeal 
waivers for a number of reasons: “[A] defendant is unlikely to 
waive this right unless she believes that some feature of a prof-
fered plea agreement makes it worth her while to do so,” waiv-
ers offer a criminal defendant an “additional bargaining chip in 
negotiations with the prosecution,” prosecutors might be un-
willing to enter the plea bargaining process without waivers, 
waivers preserve prosecutorial and judicial resources by limit-
ing baseless appeals and, relatedly, they support finality.180 
Turning to the argument that presentence appeal waivers 
can never be “knowing” because the value of the right is un-
clear—that is, the defendant cannot know how useful the ap-
pellate right will be—the Teeter court’s approach is typical. Af-
ter noting that an appeal waiver “typically embraces all 
determinations later made by the sentencing court . . . some of 
which may be quite different than either [the government or 
the defendant] thought possible,”181 the court noted that crimi-
nal defendants may knowingly waive their rights, and in guilty 
pleas—which waive “numerous rights”—defendants often give 
up rights that could potentially arise in future events, such as a 
jury trial. Thus, the “prospective nature” of waivers does not 
“place them off limits” or make them unknowing.182 
 
waivers of postconviction review unenforceable in Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 
73, 76 (Ind. 2008). 
 178. See Blank, supra note 168, at 2030. 
 179. 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Clark, 865 
F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
 180. 257 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2001).  
 181. Id. at 21; see also United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 
1992) (“While Rutan may not have known the exact dimension of the sentence, 
he knew he had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that 
right.”), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 
886 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 182. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. 
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The lower courts’ general acceptance of appeal and habeas 
waivers reinforces the conclusion that DNA waivers are unlike-
ly to be held per se invalid in most federal jurisdictions. Just as 
courts addressing facial challenges to habeas and appeal waiv-
ers presume their validity despite the potential for mischief in 
the plea bargaining process, DNA waivers will likely receive 
similar treatment—particularly at the federal level. 
b. State Courts  
States have generally followed the federal courts in the 
criminal waiver context—nearly all states to have considered 
the issue, for example, enforce appeal and habeas waivers.183 
On this basis alone, it would seem likely that the great majori-
ty of states will also enforce DNA waivers. Significantly, how-
ever, most state statutes, unlike the federal Innocence Protec-
tion Act, do not explicitly contemplate waiver—only Colorado, 
North Carolina, and South Dakota expressly allow defendants 
 
 183. At least one state, however, refuses to enforce appeal waivers on pub-
lic policy grounds, and the policy reasons provided by other states that have 
banned appeal and habeas waivers are similar. Arizona, which has banned 
appeal waivers per se, has found that “public policy forbids a prosecutor from 
insulating himself from review by bargaining away a defendant’s appeal 
rights.” State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768, 769–70 (Ariz. 1979) (“We hold that 
the right to appeal is not negotiable in plea bargaining, and that as a matter of 
public policy a defendant will be permitted to bring a timely appeal from a 
conviction notwithstanding an agreement not to appeal.”). Michigan, in previ-
ously banning appeal waivers, similarly worried about waivers’ “chilling effect 
on the right to appeal.” People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1972). Indiana, Michigan, and Arizona all invalidate appeal waivers, Malani, 
supra note 67, at 14, but it appears that currently only Arizona invalidates 
these waivers per se. See Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75–76 (Ind. 2008) 
(holding that a “defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sen-
tence as part of a written plea agreement” provided that the waiver is not “un-
intelligent or coerced” but disallowing waivers of postconviction relief ). After 
People v. Butler, where the Michigan Court of Appeals described the right to 
appeal as an “absolute right founded on a provision of our State Constitution” 
and held that allowing “the prosecution to induce defendant to waive his right 
to appeal in exchange for a plea agreement . . . is constitutionally impermissi-
ble,” 204 N.W.2d at 330, the court reversed itself. See People v. Rodriguez, 480 
N.W.2d 287, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“We find the position espoused in But-
ler . . . that the inclusion of the waiver of appeal in a plea agreement consti-
tutes inherent coercion against the exercise of the right to appeal is at odds 
with the widely accepted underpinnings of the plea bargaining system. While 
it is an important right, the right to appeal is no more fundamental than the 
right to a jury trial, which a defendant may waive by pleading guilty as long 
as it is done knowingly and voluntarily.”). Indiana also now allows appellate 
waivers. See Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75–76. 
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to waive DNA-testing rights.184 In the absence of clear evidence 
of legislative intent to allow DNA waivers, the argument 
against them becomes much stronger. 
Extending the right to postconviction DNA testing to those 
who pleaded guilty is somewhat counterintuitive and some-
times controversial.185 The conventional wisdom, which still 
claims a significant number of adherents, is that innocent peo-
ple do not plead guilty, or at least only exceedingly rarely.186 
Who, after all, would knowingly submit to undeserved punish-
ment? Viewed from this perspective, not requiring conviction by 
trial as a prerequisite to postconviction testing would be, at 
best, a poor use of government resources.187 
As will be discussed in greater depth below, however, it is 
well-established that, for a variety of reasons, innocent people 
do plead guilty188—and it requires little imagination to conclude 
that, compared to pleading guilty, signing a DNA waiver is of-
ten a comparatively small step.189 Indeed, one thing that can be 
said with certainty about innocent defendants who plead guilty 
is that they have demonstrated a willingness to give up a 
chance to contest guilt, typically in exchange for reduced pun-
 
 184. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s, 
North Carolina’s, and South Dakota’s anticipation of DNA waivers).  
 185. See, e.g., J.H. Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The 
Illogic of Post-Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 
U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 48–49 (2010) (arguing that defendants who pleaded guilty 
should have no right to DNA testing); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at 
562 n.51 (describing a prosecutor’s argument that allowing a defendant who 
pleaded guilty to obtain testing and “‘rescind his or her plea’” would “‘make[ ] a 
mockery of the criminal justice system’” (quoting Response Brief for Fla. Pros-
ecuting Att’ys Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 8, Amendment to Fla. Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 
2001) (Nos. SC01-363 & SC01-1649), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/ 
flsupct/sc01-363/comment4.pdf).  
 186. See, e.g., Daina Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers 
Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prison-
ers Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1433 (2004) (“Across society, 
many people refuse to believe that a person would confess to a crime that he 
did not commit, even though empirical data confirms that false confessions do 
occur in the American criminal justice system.”); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra 
note 50, at 562–63 (describing the “unshakable belief in the accuracy of the 
guilty verdict”).  
 187. See infra Part III.B. 
 188. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (recognizing 
that innocents plead guilty); Schulhofer, supra note 13 (describing why inno-
cents plead guilty); infra Part III.A.  
 189. See infra Part III.A.  
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ishment.190 Therefore, as a matter of legislative intent,191 it 
seems implausible that a legislature, having recognized this 
problem, and having taken the extraordinary step of creating a 
statutory right to postconviction testing in order to address it, 
would choose to allow its chosen remedy to be undermined by 
the very factors underlying the problem itself. Or to put the ar-
gument into the Mezzanatto/Hill framework, allowing waiver is 
so clearly “inconsistent with the provision creating the right 
sought to be secured”192 as to amount to an “affirmative indica-
tion of [legislative] intent to preclude waiver.”193 
Despite this argument’s considerable appeal, however, his-
tory suggests it will not enjoy wide success. Too often, the 
courts have failed to recognize—or adapt to—DNA’s unique 
properties and potential.194 Indeed, the very existence of fifty 
DNA statutes reflects, in part, courts’ unwillingness or inability 
to accommodate testing.195 This trend, combined with the wide-
spread acceptance of appeal waivers, strongly suggests that 
courts will enforce DNA waivers even in the absence of express 
legislative intent to allow them. 
B. INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES TO DNA WAIVERS 
Even if DNA waivers are not per se invalid, individual 
waivers of these rights may be unenforceable. Possible chal-
lenges include contending that the waiver was not knowing and 
voluntary, that enforcing it would be a “miscarriage of justice,” 
and that the entire plea should be withdrawn due to ineffective 
 
 190. See Schulhofer, supra note 13.  
 191. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000) (acknowledging that in 
some cases, allowing waivers could subvert legislative intent); United States v. 
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207 (1995) (making a similar acknowledgment).  
 192. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. 
 193. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201. 
 194. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1295–96 (2011) (describ-
ing Texas courts’ and the Fifth Circuit’s consistent refusals to grant DNA test-
ing under Texas’s testing statute); Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2314–16 (2009) (describing a similar history of testing denials in Alas-
ka); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61–62 
(2008) (describing how, in the cases of innocent defendants ultimately exoner-
ated by DNA, courts consistently denied relief ); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotional-
ly Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolu-
tion, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2201–04 (2010) (describing problems with 
prosecutorial tunnel vision and confirmation bias following the filing of  
charges). 
 195. Cf. Medwed, supra note 5, at 675–86 (describing the numerous hur-
dles to newly discovered evidence claims—those required for access to DNA 
testing before testing statutes created legislative rights to access).  
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assistance of counsel or, perhaps, a Brady v. United States vio-
lation.196 This Section explores these potential individual chal-
lenges to DNA waivers. (Of course, many DNA waivers include 
language allowing the prosecutor to destroy the DNA evi-
dence—in these cases, a challenge would have to be made very 
quickly to be effective.) 
1. The Knowing and Voluntary Requirement 
Courts’ general treatment of appellate and habeas waivers, 
which presumes them to be valid in the absence of certain lim-
ited exceptions, will likely inform courts’ consideration of DNA 
waivers when and if they are challenged. Looking to 
Mezzanatto and Hill, courts will recognize the presumptive va-
lidity of waivers and, in the individual case, look to the nature 
of the right to determine what suffices for waiver.197 Because 
the right to DNA testing is similar to the right to appeal and to 
habeas review, courts will likely rely upon decisions addressing 
the knowing and voluntary requirement for waiver of those 
rights prior to the 1999 amendments to the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,198 which largely ended the debate over necessary 
procedure for waivers by requiring courts to inform defendants 
that they were waiving an appeal or a right to a collateral attack 
on a sentence before accepting defendants’ plea bargains.199 
To generally enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily, the 
defendant must be “aware of the nature of the charges against 
him, including the elements” of the . . . charge,”200 and that de-
fendant must have chosen “among the alternative courses of ac-
tion open” to him.201 In investigating the voluntariness of a 
plea, the courts look to “all of the relevant circumstances sur-
rounding it,” such as the strength of a case against a defendant, 
and “the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty 
verdict after a trial.”202 A prosecutor’s revealing this type of in-
formation to a defendant does not create an involuntary plea. 
Rather, “the agents of the State may not produce a plea by ac-
tual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion over-
 
 196. See 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 197. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. 
 198. See United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (2010). As yet, there is no specific provi-
sion in the federal rules requiring courts to inform a defendant during the plea 
colloquy that he is giving up DNA testing right. 
 200. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182–83 (2005).  
 201. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).  
 202. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). 
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bearing the will of the defendant.”203 As the Court in Brady rec-
ognized, involuntariness may also arise where the defendant 
“was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency 
that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally 
weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages 
of pleading guilty.”204  
In the appeal waiver context—prior to the 1999 amend-
ments—courts generally imposed a similar requirement for a 
waiver to be knowing and voluntary.205 An appeal waiver was 
knowing and voluntary, for example, where a court alerted the 
 
 203. Id. at 750.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Since 1999, whether a waiver of an appeal or habeas right is “knowing 
and voluntary” is partially defined by statute. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure requires a court entering the plea to inform the defend-
ant in open court of “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the 
right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 11(b)(1)(N) (2010). Since the addition of this rule in 1999, courts have gen-
erally found that a failure to inform the defendant of the appeal waiver results 
in the invalidation of the waiver in the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 
618 F.3d 657, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding, on plain error review, that an 
appeal waiver was unenforceable when the court had “only obliquely” referred 
to the defendant’s appeal waiver under the Rule 11 colloquy); United States v. 
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding where a court did not “di-
rect” the defendant’s “attention to the waiver provision” as required under 
Rule 11, severing “the waiver of appellate rights from the remainder of the 
plea agreement . . . .”). When the defendant fails to preserve the Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) claim, courts generally apply the plain error standard, requiring 
the defendant to show “a reasonable probability that he would not have en-
tered the plea had the error not been made.” U.S. v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 
11, 14 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002) 
(holding that “a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error 
rule”). “However, the court is not required to conduct a specific dialogue with 
the defendant concerning the appeal waiver, so long as the record contains suf-
ficient evidence to determine whether the defendant’s acceptance of the waiver 
was knowing and voluntary.” Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th 
Cir. 1999). Further, even where a court has not provided the proper Rule 11 
information to the defendant, courts will sometimes affirm appeal and habeas 
waivers so long as they were knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lara-Joglar, 400 F. App’x 565, 570 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Ward, 518 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2008)) (validating an appeal waiver and de-
termining that “[a]lthough Rule 11 does require the court to ‘address the de-
fendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary,’ 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (2010) . . . even that general inquiry is not constitu-
tionally mandated.”) ; United States v. Polak, 573 F.3d 428, 431–32 (7th Cir. 
2009) (affirming an appeal waiver on plain error review where the court had 
failed to ask about the defendant’s “understanding” of that waiver but the de-
fendant had, among other factors indicating knowledge, “gone over the agree-
ment with his attorney” and signed the agreement below a statement indicat-
ing that he had “reviewed all aspects of the plea”).  
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defendant in court that as part of the plea agreement, “‘defend-
ant . . . expressly waives the right to appeal his sentence on any 
ground’” and the plea language itself stated, “‘Realizing the un-
certainty in estimating what sentence he will ultimately re-
ceive, the defendant knowingly waives his right to appeal the 
sentence . . . in exchange for the concessions made by the gov-
ernment in this agreement.’”206 Similarly, where a court warned 
a defendant of the constitutional rights that he was giving up 
in a plea, the plea and the appeal waiver within the plea were 
made knowingly and voluntarily because the defendant “knew 
he was giving up possible appeals, even if he did not know ex-
actly what the nature of those appeals might be.”207 
Many DNA waivers contain very specific text describing 
the nature of the right given up, and courts will likely generally 
find them valid. Even the shortest DNA waiver found in any of 
the plea agreements investigated in this Article states that the 
client is waiving “any and all rights” that he “may have, pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 3600, to require DNA testing of any physical 
evidence” and that the evidence will be unavailable for testing 
in the future.208 This certainly informs the defendant of the na-
ture of the appeals that he is giving up (by referring specifically 
to the DNA testing provision), and it at least generally alerts 
him to the existence of DNA evidence. Other DNA waivers are 
even more explicit—describing, for example, the specific hair 
and blood samples available in the case,209 warning that the de-
fendant is “giving up any ability to request DNA testing of evi-
dence in this case in the current proceeding, in any proceeding 
after conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3600, and in any proceeding 
of any type,”210 and informing the defendant that “by giving up 
this right, the defendant will never have another opportunity to 
have the evidence in the case submitted to DNA testing, or to 
employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that de-
fendant is innocent.”211 Assuming the defendant has actually 
 
 206. United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (omissions in 
original) (internal citation omitted). 
 207. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 208. Plea Agreement at 6, United States v. Bloch, No. 10-cr-215-M-01 (Apr. 
27, 210). 
 209. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11, United States v. McPike, No. 05-
30069-WDS (May 6, 2009). 
 210. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. James, No. SA CR 05-214-CJC 
(Dec. 14, 2007). 
 211. Id.  
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read and understood these provisions, waiver is very likely 
knowing and voluntary. 
If the DNA waiver is found to be knowing and voluntary, a 
defendant challenging the validity of the waiver will have to 
fall back on other factors, including, at least in some courts, an 
argument that the denial of waiver would work individual in-
justice in the case.  
2. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception 
Some federal courts invalidate appeal and habeas waivers 
where they result in a “miscarriage of justice.” The First Circuit 
has noted, for example, that because appeal “waivers are made 
before any manifestation of sentencing error emerges, appellate 
courts must remain free to grant relief from them in egregious 
cases”212—where a “miscarriage of justice occurs.”213 This princi-
ple is distinct from the public policy arguments that could 
cause waivers of some rights to be invalid on their face.214 A 
miscarriage of justice, unlike a public policy violation, arises in 
individual cases when enforcing a waiver would lead to a result 
the court finds unacceptable, such as, in the appeal waiver con-
text, leaving in place a racially motivated sentence.215 
Whether a court’s refusal to withdraw or sever a waiver 
will result in a miscarriage of justice is determined by 
the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it con-
cerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), 
the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the 
error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant ac-
quiesced in the result.216 
The Eighth Circuit, for example, has found a miscarriage of 
justice where the district court imposed an “illegal sentence,” 
which is a sentence “not authorized by the judgment of convic-
tion” or “greater or less than the permissible statutory penalty 
for the crime.”217 The Tenth Circuit similarly finds a miscar-
riage of justice where “the sentence exceeds the statutory max-
imum,” where “the district court relied on an impermissible fac-
tor such as race,” where the defendant received ineffective 
 
 212. United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001).  
 213. Id. at 26.  
 214. See supra notes 96–154 and accompanying text (discussing 
Mezzanatto’s and Hill’s approach to the permissibility of waiver). 
 215.  See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. 
 216. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26.  
 217. United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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assistance of counsel in the negotiation of the waiver, and 
“where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.”218 The Tenth Circuit 
also finds a miscarriage of justice where the waiver is the result 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.219 Other circuits have found 
that enforcing appeal waivers would result in a miscarriage of 
justice in a variety of these same circumstances.220 
If this doctrine is taken unaltered from the appeal waiver 
context, it would, for obvious reasons, have little application to 
DNA waivers. Courts may, however, adapt it to the DNA waiv-
er context. Indeed, because of DNA waivers’ considerable po-
tential to lead to injustice, such a development would be highly 
desirable. For example, a miscarriage of justice may exist 
where the defendant could show that the existence of the evi-
dence was deliberately suppressed (even if this would not vio-
late due process under Brady, as described in Part 3.a below), 
or where the defendant is able to independently demonstrate 
compelling proof of innocence, such as a credible confession by a 
third party, which could be verified by DNA testing. Courts’ 
willingness to extend this principle to DNA waivers is, of 
course, entirely speculative. 
3. Withdrawing the Plea 
In addition to arguing that a DNA waiver itself was en-
tered into unknowingly or involuntarily or that enforcement of 
the waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice, a defendant 
wishing to challenge the validity of a DNA waiver may also 
seek to withdraw the entire plea. The test for determining the 
validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a volun-
tary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of ac-
tion open to the defendant.”221 A full exploration of the factors 
rendering a plea invalid, such as, for example, ineffective assis-
 
 218. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 219. Id. 
 220. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999) (“We have 
recognized that the right to appeal survives where the agreement is involun-
tary, or the trial court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such 
as race), or (as the waiver here specifically provides) the sentence exceeded the 
statutory maximum.”); United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815 n.* (9th Cir. 
1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (per curiam) ( listing the circumstances where 
an appeal waiver may be invalid, including sentencing based on race, illegal 
sentences, breaches of plea agreements, and disparity of sentences among 
codefendants). 
 221. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). 
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tance of counsel, is impossible.222 Because of its special rele-
vance to the topic, however, one type of possible claim is worth 
addressing: the Brady violation.223  
a. Brady Violations 
Defendants who have signed DNA waivers may seek to 
withdraw the plea itself by claiming that prosecutors failed to 
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence prior to eliciting a 
waiver of the right to test this evidence.224 Like a Strickland 
challenge to a guilty plea,225 a Brady challenge must assert that 
the failure to disclose affected the plea itself; all other constitu-
tional challenges, after all, are surrendered in entering the 
guilty plea.226 A somewhat extended discussion of the applica-
 
 222. See United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting 
that “the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ is more a concept than a constant,” and 
that “[o]ther considerations will doubtless suggest themselves in specific cases”). 
 223. A challenge to the plea itself will be much more likely to succeed on 
direct appeal than it will through collateral attack. See Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (“We have strictly limited the circumstances 
under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review. It is well set-
tled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, 
who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked. 
Even the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on col-
lateral review only if first challenged on direct review.” (quoting Mabry v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984))).  
 224. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opin-
ion) (finding that favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error re-
sults from its suppression by the government, “only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different”); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
(“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused up-
on request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion.”). 
 225. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 53, 57–60 (1985) (applying Strickland’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel test to a plea challenge); cf. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984) (holding that a convicted de-
fendant must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different”). 
 226. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding that fol-
lowing a guilty plea, a defendant “may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the 
entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 
character of the guilty plea”); United States. v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (finding that “a guilty plea precludes the defendant from asserting a 
Brady violation”). 
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tion of Brady to the pretrial period is merited in light of its im-
plications for DNA waivers. As the right to pretrial discovery 
decreases, DNA waivers potentially become both more trou-
bling and more difficult to challenge. 
A number of federal and state courts have historically rec-
ognized pretrial Brady due process rights. In a comprehensive 
survey of the cases, Kevin McMunigal identified three circuits, 
one federal district court, and eight state appellate courts that 
found a “due process duty to disclose Brady material prior to 
the entry of a guilty plea.”227 Prosecutors generally had to pro-
vide not only exculpatory evidence “going to the heart of the de-
fendant’s guilt or innocence,” but also “evidence that is useful 
for impeachment, i.e., having the potential to alter the jury’s 
assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution wit-
ness.”228 Importantly, this disclosure obligation was generally 
“pertinent not only to an accused’s preparation for trial but also 
to his determination of whether or not to plead guilty.”229 In-
deed, Brady made clear that “suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due pro-
cess” where such evidence is material, regardless of whether 
the prosecutor suppressed the evidence in good or bad faith.230 
Only one federal court of appeals—the Fifth Circuit—and sev-
eral state courts had denied the pretrial Brady right.231  
A 2002 Supreme Court decision substantially changed this 
landscape. In United States v. Ruiz, the Court held that “the 
Constitution does not require the Government to disclose mate-
rial impeachment evidence,” or any information regarding any 
affirmative defense, “prior to entering a plea agreement with a 
criminal defendant.”232 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
observed that a guilty plea could be voluntary without these 
disclosures because “impeachment information is special in re-
lation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea 
is voluntary.”233 Moreover, a defendant need not know exactly 
what impeachment information he would receive at trial before 
giving up the right to that information because “the law ordi-
narily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently 
 
 227. McMunigal, supra note 41, at 653.  
 228. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1988).  
 229. Id. 
 230. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis added).  
 231. McMunigal, supra note 41, at 653–54. 
 232. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).  
 233. Id. at 628. 
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aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the 
right and how it would likely apply in general in the circum-
stances—even though the defendant may not know the specific 
detailed consequences of invoking it.”234 The Court found it 
“particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information 
as critical information of which the defendant must always be 
aware prior to pleading guilty,” because its importance depends 
on the defendant’s knowledge of the strength and contents of 
the prosecutor’s potential case.235 
The Court in Ruiz also found no relevant distinction be-
tween ignorance of impeachment evidence and the many other 
types of ignorance, such as ignorance of the strength of the 
state’s case or the admissibility of a confession the Court had 
sanctioned in the past.236 Finally, weighing the value of the as-
serted right against the cost to the government’s interest,237 the 
Court concluded that the Brady right would be of little value to 
defendants in the plea process, noting that “in any case, as the 
proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies, the Govern-
ment will provide ‘any information establishing the factual in-
nocence of the defendant,’” and that “[t]hat fact, along with 
[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11] diminishes the force of 
Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of impeachment infor-
mation, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead 
guilty.”238 It then described the heavy burdens that a right to 
pre-plea impeachment evidence would place on prosecutors, 
worrying that it “could seriously interfere with the Govern-
ment’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually 
justified”239 and could “force the Government to abandon its 
general practice of not disclosing to a defendant pleading guilty 
information that would reveal the identities of cooperating in-
formants, undercover investigators, or other prospective wit-
nesses.”240 The Court noted that “most (though not all) of the 
reasons” given for refusing to recognize a preguilty plea right to 
disclosure of impeachment information applied to information 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 630.  
 236. Id. at 631.  
 237. Id. (“[D]ue process considerations include not only (1) the nature of the 
private interest at stake, but also (2) the value of the additional safeguard, 
and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon the Government’s inter-
ests.” (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985))). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 632 (internal quotations omitted).  
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regarding affirmative defenses as well.241 Notably, Justice 
Thomas concurred in the judgment on the grounds that Brady 
does not apply at all at the plea stage.242 
The extent to which the logic of Ruiz applies to exculpatory 
information is unclear, and the issue has split the courts of ap-
peals. A number of subsequent decisions suggest that Ruiz 
should be limited to its narrow impeachment-based holding, 
and some have even held that Ruiz implies a right to pre-plea 
“factual evidence of innocence.”243 In McCann v. Mangialardi, 
for example, the Seventh Circuit determined that where prose-
cutors fail to disclose exonerating evidence prior to a guilty 
plea, “Ruiz strongly suggests that a Brady-type disclosure 
might be required under the circumstances”244 because exculpa-
tory evidence is “entirely different.”245 It concluded that “Ruiz 
indicates a significant distinction between impeachment infor-
mation and exculpatory evidence of actual innocence” and that, 
therefore, “it is highly likely that the Supreme Court would find 
a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other 
relevant government actors have actual knowledge of a crimi-
nal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such in-
formation to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea.”246  
 
 241. Id. at 633.  
 242. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The principle supporting 
Brady was ‘avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.’ That concern is not 
implicated at the plea stage . . . .” (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963))).  
 243. Compare In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 542–43 (Cal. 2008) (“Ruiz by its 
terms applies only to material impeachment evidence, and the high court em-
phasized that the government there had agreed to ‘provide any information 
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless.’”), with Ollins 
v. O’Brien, No. 03 C 5795, 03 C 7175, 2005 WL 730987, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
28, 2005) (holding that “due process requires the disclosure of information of 
factual innocence during the plea bargaining process”). 
 244. 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 788. The Tenth Circuit followed this approach in an un-
published decision. In United States v. Ohiri, the court looked to McCann and 
concluded that “the Supreme Court [in Ruiz] did not imply that the govern-
ment may avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant accepts 
an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of withheld exculpatory evi-
dence in the government’s possession.” 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005). 
Ohiri noted two important factors that distinguish Ruiz from other plea 
agreements. First, the Ruiz plea was a fast-track, federal plea prior to indict-
ment in contract to Ohiri’s “eleventh-hour plea” on the day of jury selection; and 
second, like the McCann court, the Tenth Circuit found an important difference 
between the impeachment evidence in Ruiz and exculpatory evidence. Id. 
 2012] WAIVING INNOCENCE 993 
 
Some federal district and state courts have also continued 
to follow their pre-Ruiz Brady holdings in favor of requiring 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence prior to plea bargains. The 
Northern District of Oklahoma, for example, recently required 
the prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence following a 
motion to vacate a conviction from a guilty plea, citing a Brady 
duty to disclose.247 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals similarly 
found “the thrust of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz to be 
rooted in its desire to preserve the federal ‘fast track’ plea bar-
gain process,” and has applied Brady rights where a defendant 
“made both a Brady demand and a statutory demand for excul-
patory evidence” before pleading guilty.248  
The Fifth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, de-
termining that “Ruiz never makes such a distinction” between 
types of pretrial evidence and that a distinction between im-
peachment and exculpatory evidence cannot be “implied from 
its discussion.”249 This is not surprising, given that prior to Ruiz 
the circuit identified no pretrial Brady rights, finding that be-
cause Brady protects against “potential effects of undisclosed 
information on a judge’s or jury’s assessment of guilt . . . the 
failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an 
individual waiving his right to trial is not a constitutional vio-
lation.”250 The Second Circuit agrees, for the most part with the 
Fifth Circuit, finding no distinction between impeachment and 
exculpatory evidence, and hinting that Ruiz’s limitation of pre-
trial Brady rights extends to exculpatory materials. It recently 
noted that “the Supreme Court has consistently treated excul-
patory and impeachment evidence in the same way for the pur-
pose of defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady 
material prior to trial,”251 and that Ruiz might preclude any 
 
 247. United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-41-GKF, 2010 WL 5071039, at 
*4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2010) (“[T]he Court nonetheless reminds the Govern-
ment of its duty under Brady to provide Crawford with any and all exculpato-
ry evidence.”).  
 248. State v. Harris, 667 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), aff ’d 680 
N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 2004); see also State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the circuit court’s denial of a request to withdraw a 
guilty plea “[b]ecause the State failed to provide Sturgeon with exculpatory 
evidence related to his confession to the policy and because such failure caused 
Sturgeon to plead guilty”).  
 249. United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009).  
 250. Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2000).  
 251. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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Brady right to exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea.252 Fi-
nally, it appears that the Fourth Circuit will take the Fifth and 
Second Circuit’s route. It has hinted that Ruiz extends to ex-
culpatory evidence, referring to its holding just after Ruiz that 
a prosecutor’s withholding “potentially relevant mitigation evi-
dence” prior to a plea does not merit invalidation of a guilty 
plea.253 
Even if Brady does not apply pretrial,254 some courts have 
suggested that a defendant may nonetheless be able to chal-
lenge the voluntariness of a plea due to a failure to disclose ev-
idence. The First Circuit, for example, has noted in addressing 
alleged misconduct during plea bargaining that “[u]nder lim-
ited circumstances . . . the prosecution’s failure to disclose evi-
dence may be sufficiently outrageous to constitute the sort of 
impermissible conduct that is needed to ground a challenge to 
the validity of a guilty plea”255—regardless of the Brady stand-
ard. The Fifth Circuit has employed similar reasoning.256  
Ultimately, Ruiz and subsequent opinions do not provide a 
clear answer as to the scope of pretrial rights to disclosure evi-
dence. Indeed, Ruiz’s lack of clarity on this point may have 
helped it attract eight votes. While its focus on the usefulness 
of the information to the defendant and its identification of the 
government’s interest in securing a “factually justified” guilty 
plea suggest a disclosure requirement with respect to exculpa-
 
 252. Id. (finding that “the reasoning underlying Ruiz could support a simi-
lar ruling [regarding exculpatory evidence] for a prosecutor’s obligations prior 
to a guilty plea”). This represents a change in position for the Second Circuit, 
which formerly recognized pretrial Brady rights to exculpatory material. See, 
e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The govern-
ment’s obligation [under Brady] is pertinent not only to an accused’s prepara-
tion for trial but also to his determination of whether or not to plead guilty.”). 
 253. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 254. For an argument that Brady rights are, in any case, of little value to 
defendants who plead guilty, see John C. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Un-
easy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 445 (2001) 
(explaining that Brady may be of little use to in challenges to plea agreements 
and noting that “defendants who enter pleas to especially favorable deals may 
be those who receive the least protection in post-plea Brady challenges” be-
cause the prosecution’s offer, not the evidence, had the most impact on the 
plea, yet these are the defendants most at risk of being coerced into a deal). 
 255. Ferrera v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 256. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (stat-
ing that “[e]ven if the nondisclosure is not a Brady violation,” failure to dis-
close evidence pretrial may sometimes make it “impossible for [a defendant] to 
enter a knowing and intelligent plea”). 
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tory evidence, its broader reasoning on the validity of guilty 
pleas despite defendants’ ignorance of important facts and its 
holding on information supporting any affirmative defense257 
cuts the other way.258 This uncertainty will make Brady claims 
by state prisoners particularly difficult on federal habeas re-
view because a federal habeas petitioner bringing an exhausted 
state claim is often required to show that the state court deci-
sion was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law.259 It will also make it more likely that 
some defendants will sign DNA waivers without knowing what 
evidence exists. 
C. WAIVERS APPLIED  
As established above, any court reviewing a defendant’s 
challenge to a plea bargain with a DNA waiver will begin by 
presuming validity.260 Depending on a defendant’s challenge to 
the waiver, however, the court must also ask whether the de-
fendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to DNA 
testing, whether (perhaps) the waiver is a miscarriage of jus-
tice, or whether the plea as a whole—as a result of Strickland 
or Brady—may be withdrawn. Building on the discussion 
above, but not addressing the possibility of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, this Section explores the likelihood that a 
court would enforce a DNA waiver in a range of possible factual 
scenarios.261 In each scenario, three factors are considered: first, 
 
 257. See, e.g., Rehal, 618 F.3d at 154 & n.5 (noting that Ruiz’s rejection of 
“the argument that the Constitution requires the pre-plea disclosure of infor-
mation supporting any affirmative defense” supports the conclusion that pros-
ecutors do not have an obligation to provide Brady material prior to a guilty 
plea). 
 258. Even if there is a pretrial Brady right, some courts have taken the po-
sition that untested DNA evidence does not meet the materiality standard. See 
infra notes 277–78 and accompanying text. 
 259. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of, clearly established Federal law . . . .”). 
 260. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 261. It is worth emphasizing again that a defendant may have no remedy 
for destruction of DNA evidence pursuant to an apparently valid waiver later 
deemed unenforceable. Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) 
(“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, 
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of 
due process of law.”). 
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the prosecutor’s and defendant’s knowledge of the evidence and 
testing technologies; second, whether DNA testing has already 
been done; and third, the degree of detail in the description of 
the evidence in the waiver itself. 
1. Complete Defendant and Prosecutor Knowledge of 
Evidence, Thorough Testing, and a Specific Description of 
Present and Possible Future Evidence in the Waiver 
In the first hypothetical bargaining scenario, a prosecutor 
or the police (the distinction is largely irrelevant as a result of 
Kyles v. Whitley)262 have all of the evidence from the crime  
scene and have thoroughly tested it. It is unlikely, based on 
what both sides know, that further evidence will appear or be-
come testable by improved technology in the foreseeable future. 
Both the prosecution and the defendant are aware of all of the 
evidence from the scene and the testing results, and the results 
are clearly inculpatory. Both the nonbiological and DNA evi-
dence point strongly to the defendant’s guilt, and both the de-
fendant and the prosecutor know this. The language of the 
DNA waiver itself also refers directly to the items of evidence 
identified, tested, and known to both parties. Further, the DNA 
waiver makes clear that if future evidence or testing were to be 
available, the defendant would have no rights to it. No waivers 
identified for this Article satisfy all of these criteria, but one 
waiver in the Southern District of Illinois comes close to meet-
ing this standard. The waiver identifies “physical evidence in 
this case which may have biological evidence, such as semen, 
blood, saliva, hair, skin, tissue, or other identifiable biological 
material, that could be subjected to DNA testing either now or 
in the future.”263 
In this scenario, the defendant is aware and has knowledge 
of the evidence and has likely carefully thought through its im-
plications for his case. He knows that identification of further 
evidence is unlikely and that even if further evidence were un-
earthed, if would not do much good. All that the criminal de-
fendant will therefore give up in a DNA waiver is the right to 
further, independent testing of DNA evidence that has already 
 
 262. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that because 
the prosecutor is responsible for determining when the “net effect” requires 
disclosure of evidence, the “prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evi-
dence known to . . . the police”).  
 263. Plea Agreement § 7, United States v. McPike, Criminal No. 05-30069-
WDS (S.D. Ill., May 6, 2005). 
 2012] WAIVING INNOCENCE 997 
 
been tested thoroughly by the state, and the defendant will 
likely take the deal. A court, in turn, will have few, if any, rea-
sons to question the knowing and voluntary nature of the waiv-
er; nor is there any miscarriage of justice. Finally, there is no 
Brady violation because no exculpatory evidence has been 
withheld. In this scenario, a DNA waiver is almost certain to be 
enforced. 
2. Complete Prosecutor and Defendant Knowledge of 
Evidence, No Testing, and Specific Description of Evidence in 
the Waiver  
The second hypothetical DNA waiver scenario is identical 
to the first, with the exception of testing. The prosecutor has 
collected all of the evidence from the crime scene. It is unlikely 
that more evidence will emerge, but the prosecutor has identi-
fied and revealed to the defendant specific items that could po-
tentially be available or subject to better testing in the future, 
if any are known. Both the prosecutor and defendant are fully 
aware of the evidence and its nature, and the DNA waiver spe-
cifically describes the evidence as well as specific possible fu-
ture pieces of evidence and future available testing. Again, the 
language of the waiver makes clear that the defendant is giving 
up the right both to have access to and test specific existing ev-
idence and potential future evidence. In this scenario, however, 
the prosecutor has not tested the available DNA evidence. This 
scenario is similar to the facts reflected in a federal plea bar-
gain in the Southern District of California, with a waiver that 
reads as follows:  
Defendant has been advised that the government may have in its 
possession items of physical evidence that could be subjected to DNA 
testing. The defendant understands that the government does not in-
tend to conduct DNA testing of any of these items. Defendant under-
stands that, before entering guilty pleas pursuant to this Plea 
Agreement, he could request DNA testing of evidence in this case. 
The defendant further understands that, with respect to the offenses 
to which he is pleading guilty pursuant to this Plea Agreement, he 
would have the right to request DNA testing of evidence after convic-
tion under the conditions specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3600. Knowing and 
understanding his right to request DNA testing, the defendant know-
ingly and voluntarily gives up that right with respect to both the spe-
cific items listed above and any other items of evidence there may be 
in this case that might be amenable to DNA testing. . . . The defend-
ant further understands and acknowledges that by giving up this 
right, he will never have another opportunity to have the evidence in 
this case, whether or not listed above, submitted for DNA testing, or 
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to employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that defend-
ant is innocent of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty.264 
The Supreme Court has held that when a prosecutor has 
evidence but has not tested it or otherwise determined its ex-
culpatory or inculpatory nature, the prosecutor’s failure to test 
does not, in itself, violate the Constitution.265 Further, the fail-
ure to test likely does not prevent the defendant’s plea from be-
ing voluntary. First, the defendant has been specifically in-
formed that the government “does not intend” to conduct the 
testing but that, absent the waiver, the defendant could request 
it. This situation is roughly analogous to cases prior to the 1999 
Rule 11 amendments where defendants who knew generally 
about their rights to appeal but not about all specific potential 
appeals were found to have entered an appeal waiver knowing-
ly and voluntarily.266 Defendants need not know all possible op-
tions. Nor is there a Brady problem, as the prosecutor has dis-
closed the evidence. Assuming that there is adequate proof that 
the defendant understood the waiver, it is very likely to be en-
forced. If a court recognizes a miscarriage of justice exception, 
however, it may find one here if the defendant is able to raise 
serious doubts about his guilt. 
3. No Prosecutor or Defendant Knowledge of Evidence, no 
Testing, General Description of Evidence in the Waiver 
In a third, less happy scenario, neither the prosecutor nor 
the defendant possesses biological evidence from the crime  
scene at the time of the plea; alternately, both parties have ac-
cess to evidence, but it is not currently testable. In either case, 
the prosecutor has not tested the evidence and therefore does 
not know whether it is inculpatory, exculpatory, or indetermi-
nate. Due to the lack of currently testable evidence, the waiver 
does not refer to specific items, but is as specific as the facts al-
low: it warns the defendant that he is giving up a right to test 
any evidence that may be available in the future, or current ev-
idence that is untestable now but may be testable in the future. 
 
 264. Plea Agreement at 11–12, United States v. Ortega, No. 2:09-CR-00517 
GEB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010) (on file with author).  
 265. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 (1988) (holding that “the police do not 
have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”); cf. infra note 278 
and accompanying text (arguing that untested but potentially exculpatory ma-
terial must be disclosed under Brady). 
 266. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 
1990) (holding that the defendant’s appeal waiver was made knowingly, even 
though he may not have known the exact nature of the appeals he had given up).  
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Most DNA waivers do not appear to be this explicit with re-
spect to future testing, but some are—providing, for example, 
that “the physical evidence in this case will . . . be unavailable 
for DNA testing in the future.”267 
As in the previous two scenarios, this DNA waiver is likely 
valid. The defendant here has sufficient knowledge of various 
potential outcomes of the case and can likely make a reasona-
ble assessment of his chances under the circumstances. The 
fact that the evidence itself or certain testing techniques are 
not currently available will not change the outcome. If defend-
ants can knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights while 
operating under a misapprehension of “the quality of the 
State’s case,”268 then they can certainly waive rights when both 
the prosecutor and defendant face unknowable facts. And if an 
advanced testing technology later emerges that casts doubt on 
the defendant’s guilt, “a plea’s validity may not be collaterally 
attacked merely because the defendant made what turned out, 
in retrospect, to be a poor deal.”269 If, on the other hand, the 
waiver is vague with respect to evidence not currently in the 
government’s possession, a court may not enforce it with re-
spect to newly discovered evidence.270 
As in scenario two, there is also no Brady violation here, as 
no evidence has been suppressed. If the defendant is able to 
produce testable evidence, however, a miscarriage of justice 
standard is stronger because of the apparent unfairness of a 
bar on testing newly available evidence. 
 
 267. Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. Natera, No. 3:09-CR-221 JBH 
HBF (C.D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2010); see also, e.g., Plea Agreement at 5, United 
States v. Almanza, No. 1:09-CR-430 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with au-
thor) (“[T]he waiver forecloses any opportunity to have evidence submitted for 
DNA testing in this case or in any post-conviction proceeding for any  
purpose . . . .”). 
 268. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (finding “no require-
ment in the Constitution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his 
solemn admission in open court that he committed the act with which he is 
charged simply because it later develops that the State would have had a 
weaker case than the defendant had thought”).  
 269. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005).  
 270. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. White, No. 1:07-CR-
314-RCL (D.D.C. May 1, 2008) (on file with author) (providing that defendant 
“waives any and all right . . . to require DNA testing of any physical evidence 
in the possession of the Government”). 
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4. Concealed Prosecutor Knowledge of Evidence, Evidence Not 
Tested, No Specific Description of Evidence in the Waiver 
Moving toward more legally tenuous ground, in the fourth 
factual DNA waiver hypothetical, the facts are similar to sce-
nario two above. There is specific evidence in the case, and the 
prosecutor has knowledge of the evidence but has not tested it. 
In this scenario, though, the prosecution embarks upon two 
questionable courses of action. First, she does not tell the de-
fendant that the evidence exists, and second, she does not spe-
cifically refer to the evidence in the DNA waiver. Instead, she 
simply states that the defendant waives “any evidence that the 
prosecution might have.” One waiver in the Eastern District of 
Virginia—in a case in which, presumably, no evidence was con-
cealed—used this type of ambiguous language, stating, “The 
defendant . . . understands that this waiver applies to DNA 
testing of any items of evidence in this case that could be sub-
jected to DNA testing . . . .”271 This language, unlike previous 
waiver examples, does not necessarily make clear that there is 
any biological evidence in the case (although it should give 
competent counsel reason to wonder) and also does not make 
clear whether any of the evidence could or has been subjected 
to DNA testing. 
Although the failure to test will not make the DNA waiver 
unknowing or involuntary—since the prosecutor him or herself 
does not know how valuable the DNA may be—the failure to 
specifically describe the evidence in the plea bargain may inval-
idate the DNA waiver by rendering it unknowing.272 Even 
though courts have found that general descriptions of rights 
can make a waiver of those rights sufficiently knowing and vol-
untary,273 the right to DNA testing is quite specific.274 In con-
trast to the appeal waiver scenario, in which a defendant gen-
erally apprised of appeal rights will have enough information to 
know, in general, what he is giving up, a defendant who is en-
tirely unaware of the existence of potentially testable DNA evi-
dence will arguably not know that he is actually giving up any-
 
 271. Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v. Jin, Criminal No. 09-CR-
249 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2009). 
 272. Cf. Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that “[e]ven if the nondisclosure is not a Brady violation,” failure to disclose 
evidence pretrial may sometimes make it “impossible for [a defendant] to enter 
a knowing and intelligent plea”). 
 273. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 207.  
 274. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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thing—let alone the specifics of that right. Despite the appeal 
of this argument, however, it is very similar to the one rejected 
in Ruiz, in which the Court emphasized that “the law ordinari-
ly considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently 
aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the 
right and how it would likely apply in general in the circum-
stances—even though the defendant may not know the specific 
detailed consequences of invoking it.”275 
There may be a Brady violation, however, assuming any 
such right exists prior to the entry of a guilty plea.276 The prose-
cutor has evidence, but she has not told the defendant about 
the evidence or tested it to determine whether it is exculpatory; 
she is also requesting in the waiver that the evidence be de-
stroyed. Because the prosecution has not tested the evidence, 
and therefore does not know whether or not it is exculpatory, 
some courts considering similar scenarios have held that the 
evidence is not material under Brady.277 As has been persua-
sively argued, however, “[s]uggestions that DNA need not be 
tested because ‘it is not now known whether the biological evi-
dence being sought by [the defendant] would be favorable or 
unfavorable to him’ and could have been denied at trial mis-
 
 275. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
 276. See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing Brady challenges to waivers of 
DNA testing). 
 277. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 385 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., 
concurring) (“Harvey’s denial of access to the [untested] biological evidence 
after his conviction and sentencing, standing alone, fails to contravene 
Brady.”); Richard v. Girdich, No. 9:03-CV-920, 2009 WL 2045685, at *12  
(N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (“Since the biological evidence that forms the basis of 
these habeas claims was not subjected to forensic testing—and was, therefore, 
not necessarily exculpatory—Petitioner is not entitled to habeas intervention 
on his claims that the District Attorney did not preserve such potentially ex-
culpatory evidence. . . . Furthermore, because the forensic evidence about 
which Petitioner now complains was not subject to DNA testing, his claims 
that the prosecutor necessarily suppressed exculpatory evidence . . . is neces-
sarily rooted in speculation.”); Nelson v. Blades, No. CV 04-001-S-LMB, 2009 
WL 790172, at *11 (D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2009) (“[Petitioner] does not have a val-
id claim under [Brady] because there is no indication that any non-disclosed 
item actually held exculpatory value to him. More to the point, Petitioner does 
not have any evidence that the towels did not contain an oily substance or his 
genetic material, or that the testing of any other items would have been favor-
able to him. The most that can be said is that some items might have been po-
tentially useful.”); Roughley v. Dretke, No. 3:04-CV-1667-N, 2004 WL 
2468520, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2004) (“It also is conceded that DNA testing 
was not performed on any tangible evidence prior to his criminal trial, thus 
there was no ‘Brady’ material which could have been withheld.”). 
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read Supreme Court precedent and exalt willful ignorance.”278 
Nonetheless, as John Douglass has observed: “Volumes of 
Brady opinions demonstrate that reviewing courts are reluc-
tant to find nondisclosures ‘material’ when it means upsetting a 
jury verdict. It is not hard to imagine, then, how skeptical judg-
es will be when a defendant demands to take back his own 
open-court confession of guilt.”279 
Even if a defendant is unable to make a successful Brady 
claim here, a court, following reasoning similar to that em-
ployed by the First and Fifth Circuits,280 might still find the 
failure to disclose the evidence to be “outrageous”281 and refuse 
to affirm the plea. And if the court recognizes a miscarriage of 
justice exception, this scenario would be a strong candidate.282 
 
 278. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at 587 (footnote omitted). 
 279. Douglass, supra note 254, at 478. 
 280. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
 281. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006); Matthew 
v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Even if the nondisclosure 
is not a Brady violation, it may be argued . . . that it made it impossible for 
[the defendant] to enter a knowing and intelligent plea.”); see also text accom-
panying notes 255–256. 
 282. See supra Part II.B.2. Also note that a prosecutor who deliberately 
conceals untested DNA evidence prior to a plea bargain has likely violated the 
ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d), which, in concert with a sub-
sequent ABA Formal Opinion, appears to require timely disclosure of evidence 
prior to guilty pleas. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT  R. 3.8(d) (2010); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 9-454, (2009) (providing 
that “prior to a guilty plea, to enable the defendant to make a well-advised 
plea at the time of arraignment, a prosecutor must disclose known evidence 
and information that would be relevant or useful to establishing a defense or 
negating the prosecution’s proof”). Indeed, at least one state supreme court 
has suspended a prosecutor for failing to disclose potentially useful DNA evi-
dence prior to a guilty plea, citing rules of professional responsibility and not 
Brady. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 790 N.E.2d 1195, 1196–97 
(Ohio 2003) (“[The] Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charged [the prosecutor] 
with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”). But 
even that court subsequently held that the ethical duty of disclosure was no 
greater than the constitutional and duty, raising, once again the Brady ques-
tion. Disciplinary Council v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) 
(“We decline to construe [the ethics rules] as requiring a grater scope of disclo-
sure than Brady . . . .”); see also Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of ) Enforce-
ment of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 860–62 (2010) 
(discussing Kellogg-Martin as an example of the reluctance of courts to enforce 
disclosure rules). Beyond that, “disciplinary authorities rarely proceed against 
prosecutors in cases that raise interpretive questions under Rule 3.8(d),” ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, supra, and there may be sufficient 
doubt as to the materiality of untested evidence to allow prosecutors to gener-
ally escape sanction.  
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5. Concealed Prosecutor Knowledge of Evidence, Evidence 
Tested and Exculpatory, No Specific Description of Evidence in 
Waiver 
In the final scenario, in which the arguments are strongest 
for invalidity, the facts are identical to scenario four, but now 
the prosecutor has the evidence, has tested it and knows that it 
is exculpatory, and has still not revealed the evidence to the de-
fendant. Nor has the prosecutor specifically referred to the ex-
istence of the specific evidence in the waiver. Rather, she has 
once again used general language in the waiver, stating that 
the defendant “waives any evidence that the prosecution might 
have.” In this case, the argument that the waiver is unknowing 
and involuntary is similar to that in scenario four, albeit per-
haps more compelling due to the obvious unfairness at work.283  
This factual scenario would also present a true test of 
whether Brady rights extend to the pretrial context.284 Any 
court that has interpreted Ruiz to leave room for a pretrial 
Brady right to exculpatory evidence would likely find that the 
prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated 
the defendant’s constitutional right.285 Assuming the evidence is 
conclusive, the defendant could also likely show a “‘reasonable 
probability that but for the failure to produce such information 
the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead 
would have insisted on going to trial.’”286 
As in scenario four, even if a defendant is unable to make a 
successful Brady claim here, some courts might still find the 
failure to disclose the evidence to be sufficiently shocking to 
render the plea involuntary.287 And, again, if the jurisdiction 
 
 283. In scenario four, the prosecutor concealed knowledge of the evidence, 
but did not test it. Here, the prosecutor has tested the evidence and knows it is 
exculpatory. 
 284. See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing Brady challenges to waivers of 
DNA testing and discussing how some courts have recognized Brady rights 
prior to a guilty plea). 
 285. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Ruiz strongly suggest that a Brady-type disclosure might be required under 
the circumstances . . . . Ruiz indicates a significant distinction between im-
peachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.”); supra 
Part II.B.3.a (discussing Ruiz and its interpretation in the circuit courts). 
 286. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 256 (2d. Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24 (2d. Cir. 1992)); see also Hashimoto, supra note 
40, at 955 n.33 (discussing the Brady materiality standard as applied to plea 
bargains). 
 287. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the “outrageous” standard as applied 
to a similar fact pattern). 
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recognizes a miscarriage of justice exception, this scenario 
would be extremely likely to qualify.288 
In sum, DNA waivers are likely to survive challenges in a 
variety of factual scenarios—including, depending on the juris-
diction, some that are fairly disturbing. Up to this point, this 
Article has provided a descriptive account of DNA waivers. It 
has identified their relatively common use at the federal level 
through 2010, has suggested that they may expand to the 
states if they have not already, and has explored their validity 
in anticipation of likely challenges to DNA waivers in courts. 
The following Part presents a normative account of DNA waiv-
ers, considering arguments both for and against their use and 
suggesting that on balance, prosecutors’ use of waivers is prob-
lematic in most circumstances.  
III.  DNA TESTING WAIVERS AS POLICY   
Although no court has directly addressed the issue, as dis-
cussed in Part II, DNA waivers are likely to be enforceable un-
der at least some circumstances.289 The question remains, how-
ever, when, if ever, are they desirable. As the Department of 
Justice has already done in at least two circumstances,290 the 
federal government can encourage or discourage the use of 
DNA waivers for policy reasons, as can state prosecutors’ offic-
es. This Part explores the arguments both for and against DNA 
waivers. 
A. AGAINST WAIVERS 
DNA waivers destroy biological evidence or, at minimum, 
preclude defendants from accessing this evidence following 
their plea bargain.291 This leads, or could lead, to several unde-
sirable results for defendants and society as a whole. Because 
there is reason to believe that some innocent defendants will 
both plead guilty and agree to a DNA waiver, DNA waivers will 
likely keep some innocent defendants in prison. In doing so, 
waivers may cover up prosecutorial misconduct. Even in the 
 
 288. See supra Part II.C.4 (arguing that the miscarriage of justice standard 
could apply to a similar fact pattern). 
 289. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text (discussing the validi-
ty of DNA waivers). 
 290. See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text (discussing Department 
of Justice memoranda on the use of DNA waivers).  
 291. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (giving examples of plea 
agreements). 
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absence of prosecutorial wrongdoing, the public’s interest in 
uncovering wrongful convictions—both to apprehend the true 
criminals and to isolate flaws in the system—is thwarted. 
Moreover, DNA waivers undermine confidence in the criminal 
justice system as a whole: the use of waivers suggests to the 
public that subjecting conviction to the most powerful test of 
truth available is a thing to be avoided. And by turning the 
right to DNA testing into yet another bargaining chip, DNA 
waivers weaken the societal commitment to innocence—a 
commitment embodied in fifty DNA testing statutes.292 
1. Preventing Relief for the Wrongfully Convicted 
As introduced in Part I, it is well-established that some in-
nocent defendants plead guilty. Of the 266 wrongfully convicted 
defendants who had been exonerated by DNA as of February 
2011, twenty-two pleaded guilty,293 and even more made false 
admissions.294 It is likely that the same motivations that drive 
people to falsely profess their guilt will often also drive them to 
sign away their right to prove their innocence. 
A criminal defendant considering a guilty plea calculates, 
to the best of his knowledge, the likelihood of conviction, the 
likelihood of receiving a less desirable sentence outside of the 
bargaining process, and the importance of the trial process to 
the defendant, for example.295 When making the value-
probability consideration, however, the defendant often has 
very limited information to work with, and “[i]nnocent defend-
ants often have less information about the case against them 
than guilty defendants.”296 Where a defendant was not at the 
crime scene, for example, he may not know whether there were 
eyewitnesses.297 Other defendants who may have been near or 
at the crime scene with other people may not themselves know 
 
 292. See supra note 14 (providing examples of state DNA testing statutes). 
 293. When the Innocent Plead Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php# 
( last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 294. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 13, at 444–49 (analyzing the likelihood 
that defendants in sixty different cases made false confessions).  
 295. See Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confes-
sions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 945 (2010) (“[Defend-
ants’] decision is presumably based on numerous factors, including their un-
derstanding of the law, the probability of conviction at trial, the value of the 
plea offer . . . advice and perceived effectiveness of attorneys, perceptions of 
procedural justice, etc.”).  
 296. Hashimoto, supra note 40, at 951.  
 297. Id.  
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“whether they committed the offense,” for example—if they 
were intoxicated, or mentally ill or handicapped.298 And beyond 
informational limitations, the literature has begun to document 
other factors that may influence the decision to plead guilty, in-
cluding factors such as “race, ethnicity, [and] gender,” as well 
as age;299 pressure from family members; and, more generally, 
an overwhelming sense of “despair” when faced with the power 
of the State.300 Innocent defendants may also be more risk 
averse, in which case “[p]rosecutorial bluffing is likely to work 
particularly well” against them.301 Finally, innocent defendants, 
especially those who are indigent, may be pushed to take a plea 
by their lawyers: “defense attorneys have powerful incentives 
to avoid trial, even when a trial would be in the client’s inter-
est.”302 In sum, there are sound reasons to believe that the plea 
bargaining system induces innocent people to plead guilty,303 
and the available evidence supports this belief.  
Very likely, the same factors that drive innocent defend-
ants to plead guilty will drive some of them to agree to a DNA 
waiver. Compared to pleading guilty, a DNA waiver may be a 
small concession, if it is deliberated over at all.304 This is espe-
cially likely to be true if the defendant is not aware of any evi-
dence to be tested. And for those innocent defendants who sign 
 
 298. Id. 
 299. Redlich, supra note 295.  
 300. Barkai, supra note 40, at 96–97. 
 301. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2495 (2004); see also F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma 
Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prose-
cutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 199 (2002) 
 (explaining that for innocent defendants, “[t]he prosecutor will offer increas-
ingly enticing bargains to the defendant because the evidence does not bear 
out [the charges]” and “[e]ventually there may come a point where, even for 
the innocent, accepting the prosecutor’s offer may seem more attractive than 
the risk of trial”).  
 302. Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1988: see also Eunyung Theresa Oh, 
Note, Innocence After “Guilt”: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents Who 
Pled Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 167–68 (2004) (explaining that indigent 
defendants’ attorneys often encourage guilty pleas and, when they meet their 
client for the first time, “bring a negotiated plea with them”).  
 303. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3, 12–19 (1978) (discussing the parallels between medieval torture and 
the modern plea bargaining system, and characterizing the modern American 
system as one in which the state “coerce[s] the accused against whom we find 
probable cause to confess [their] guilt”). 
 304. On the other hand, as discussed below, prosecutorial insistence on a 
DNA waiver may push some innocent defendants to demand trial. See infra 
Part III.B.2. 
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them, DNA waivers will significantly limit their ability to ac-
cess exculpatory evidence.305 
Where DNA waivers do prevent the wrongfully convicted 
from establishing their innocence, moreover, it is not only the 
defendant who suffers, but the public as well.306 Exonerations 
frequently lead to the apprehension of the actual perpetrator,307 
and the public has a strong interest in ensuring that innocent 
defendants are not wrongfully imprisoned.308 Where an inno-
cent defendant is able to prove a wrongful conviction on appeal 
or through habeas, each court decision reversing a conviction 
also adds to the body of the literature describing the flaws that 
led to the wrongful conviction.309 Although most court decisions 
do not describe these flaws in detail, innocence commissions of-
ten investigate the cases after-the-fact to identify causal factors 
such as false confessions, erroneous eyewitness testimony, and 
flawed forensic techniques.310 Reducing the number of exonera-
tions, then, reduces the available data on which to base re-
form.311 
2. Increasing the Likelihood of Wrongful Convictions by 
Concealing Wrongdoing, Eliminating Review, and Eroding the 
Commitment to Innocence 
DNA waivers will increase the likelihood of wrongful con-
victions at the plea bargaining stage in several ways. First, and 
most obviously, DNA waivers have the potential to conceal po-
 
 305. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
DNA waivers and discussing their effect on access to and preservation of 
evidence). 
 306. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 702–08 (discussing the benefits of ex-
onerations for families, victims, and communities). 
 307. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PRO-
JECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_ 
Exonerations.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“The true suspects and/or per-
petrators have been identified in 124 of the DNA exoneration cases.”); see also 
Wiseman, supra note 10, at 695–702 (describing several identifications of real 
perpetrators following DNA exonerations). 
 308. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 705 (discussing the benefits of post-
humous exonerations, including that they are “important to the community 
and its sense of fairness and justice”). 
 309. Id. at 702 (“[P]osthumous exonerations can serve a valuable role in 
the effort to prevent wrongful convictions by producing instructive findings on 
their causes . . . .”). 
 310. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 726–35 (describing the role and prac-
tices of innocence commissions). 
 311. See id. at 717–18 (“Without posthumous exoneration, the lessons that 
could be gleaned from their misfortunes die with them.”). 
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lice and prosecutorial misconduct, including the failure to turn 
over exculpatory DNA evidence, whether deliberate or through 
negligence.312 This is particularly true for those waivers that al-
low for the immediate destruction of evidence and those that 
apply to evidence which the defendant is unaware of and which 
may not have been available or testable at the time of the plea. 
For example, many of the DNA waivers used by federal prose-
cutors cause the defendant to waive “any opportunity to have 
evidence submitted for DNA testing in this case or in any post-
conviction proceeding for any purpose.”313 Others waive “any 
and all right” to “require DNA testing of any physical evidence 
in the possession of the Government” and to the preservation of 
“any physical evidence in this case.”314 Literally applied, such a 
waiver would bar testing whether the defendant knew that 
there was testable material or not when he signed. This is es-
pecially troubling in light of the uncertainty over the existence 
of a pretrial right to exculpatory evidence.315 
More subtly, DNA waivers may also lead to reduced accu-
racy in plea bargaining by reducing prosecutors’ incentives for 
convicting only the guilty. Waivers of DNA testing, like appeal 
and habeas waivers, protect prosecutors from review. As one 
attorney has described appeal waivers, they “have the ad-
vantage of putting an end to it. It’s peace of mind, nice to know 
you’re not going to end up in two years arguing” a collateral 
challenge.316 This protection may be especially valuable to pros-
ecutors because being proven to have convicted an innocent de-
fendant has negative professional, and perhaps psychological, 
 
 312. Cf. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 247 (“[O]ne concern with full 
blanket [appeal] waivers is that attorneys will not be as careful as they should 
be if they know their past and future mistakes are protected from scrutiny.”). 
 313. E.g., Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v. Almanza, No. 
l:09cr430 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v. 
Gomez, No. l:07cr125 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2007). 
 314. Plea Agreement § 21, at 31, United States v. Headley, No. 09 CR 830-
3 (N.D. Ill.) (using identical language); Letter from Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. At-
torney, Dep’t. of Justice, to Jerry Ray Smith, Esquire 6 (Jan. 19, 2007) (using 
identical language); see also Plea Agreement § III.7.A., at 11, United States v. 
McPike, Criminal No. 05-30069-WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005) (defendant cedes 
all right to testing of “physical evidence in this case which may have biological 
evidence, such as semen, blood, saliva, hair, skin tissue, or other identifiable 
biological material, that could be subjected to DNA testing either now or in the 
future”).  
 315. See supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text. 
 316. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 245–46 (quoting telephone interview 
with Defender #21).  
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consequences for a prosecutor.317 Indeed, this may help explain 
why prosecutors will sometimes vigorously oppose 
postconviction DNA testing when it would be highly probative 
and even continue to assert the defendant’s guilt after exculpa-
tory results.318 These consequences give prosecutors an addi-
tional incentive to be sure of the defendant’s guilt before prose-
cuting. If the prosecutor is able to routinely obtain DNA 
waivers,319 this incentive disappears, and the rate of wrongful 
convictions may rise.320  
Finally, DNA waivers may also increase the likelihood of 
wrongful convictions by eroding the burgeoning commitment to 
treating the right to establish innocence, at least by conclusive 
DNA evidence, as qualitatively different. This commitment is 
expressed in state and federal testing statutes,321 as well as re-
cent changes to the rules of professional conduct322 and the Su-
preme Court’s apparent, grudging acceptance of the existence 
of a habeas claim founded on actual innocence.323 As many have 
 
 317. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138 (2004) (describing 
the psychological and personal factors that affect prosecutors’ views of post-
conviction innocence claims). 
 318. See id. at 129 (“Likewise, qualitative evidence of prosecutorial indif-
ference and, on occasion, hostility to even the most meritorious of post-
conviction innocence claims is alarming.”). 
 319. A refusal to sign a waiver, though, may, to some extent, help innocent 
defendants signal their innocence at the pretrial stage. See infra notes 345–47 
and accompanying text. 
 320. This very concern has led a few courts to prohibit appeal waivers, 
holding, for example, that “public policy forbids the prosecutor from insulating 
himself from review by either implicitly or explicitly bargaining away a de-
fendant’s right to appeal.” People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476, 477 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1975); see also United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D. Mass. 
1999) (“[T]he market for plea bargains, like every other market, should not be 
so deregulated that the conditions essential to assuring basic fairness are  
undermined.”). 
 321. See supra note 14 (describing the fifty state, federal, and District of 
Columbia statutes).  
 322. See supra note 15 (discussing the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct R. 3.8(g), (h)). 
 323. See, e.g., In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.) (transferring Troy 
Davis’s petition for an original writ of habeas corpus to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Georgia for “hearing and determina-
tion” and directing that court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact 
as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial 
clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence”); Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129 
S. Ct. 2308, 2321–22 (2009) (noting that it is an “open question” whether a 
“federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of ‘actual innocence’” ex-
ists); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–38, 555 (2006) (assuming arguendo that 
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noted, although the law allows, and even requires, the contin-
ued imprisonment of those whose convictions were obtained in 
violation of the Constitution,324 there is a general consensus 
that when convincing evidence of innocence exists, convictions 
should be overturned.325 While this focus on factual innocence 
may do little directly for the majority of defendants who are ac-
cused of crimes for which no biological evidence is available,326 
indirectly, it reinforces the ideal of punishing only the guilty—
and all innocent defendants benefit from widespread commit-
ment to this ideal. The use of DNA waivers, however, is incon-
sistent with this ideal. Commodifying the right to prove inno-
cence through DNA waivers risks the loss of its sanctity.327 Like 
the right to impeachment evidence, to trial, or to an appeal, it 
becomes just another bargaining chip. 
3. Reducing Public Confidence 
Convicting innocent defendants—although perhaps not en-
tirely unavoidable—is deeply morally troublesome; so is leaving 
them in prison when proof of their innocence might be, or could 
have been, available. Even if DNA waivers never prevent a sin-
gle exoneration or lead to even one wrongful conviction, howev-
er, they still may impose significant social costs.328 As has been 
 
freestanding innocence claims are possible, and holding that they require at 
least “more convincing proof of innocence” than a showing that it is more likely 
than not that no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt had the new evidence been available at trial); Herre-
ra v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (“We may assume . . . that in a capital 
case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial 
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant fed-
eral habeas relief . . . .”); see also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 
3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (concluding that “while executing an 
innocent person would violate the United States Constitution, Mr. Davis has 
failed to prove his innocence”). The Supreme Court denied Mr. Davis’s petition 
for habeas corpus. In re Davis, 131 S. Ct. 1808 (2011) (mem.).  
 324. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (allowing federal courts to grant 
habeas relief from state convictions in only very limited circumstances).  
 325. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 317, at 127 (“Frequently . . . the public 
rhetoric and personal beliefs expressed by prosecutors condemn the idea that 
any district attorney would willingly permit an innocent person to languish in 
prison.”). 
 326. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1571–
72 (“[O]nly an estimated 10 to 20 percent of criminal cases have biological evi-
dence available for testing . . . .”).  
 327. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 
DUKE L.J. 56, 57–62 (1993) (contrasting “commodified” forms of compensation 
for wrongdoing with “noncommodified conceptions” of “corrective justice”). 
 328. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1386 (“[J ]ustice and punishment are classic 
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noted in another context, “[p]ublic confidence and faith in the 
justice system are essential to the law’s democratic legitimacy, 
moral force, and popular obedience.”329 The criminal justice sys-
tem should, therefore, “forestall cynicism by forbidding practic-
es that openly promote injustice or public doubts about guilt.”330 
DNA waivers, however, promote doubt and cynicism. They send 
the message that the government is more interested in cost 
savings and administrative convenience—or worse, covering up 
wrongdoing—than in using the most powerful evidence of truth 
available.331  
The damage, moreover, will be compounded by the natural 
consequences of DNA waivers: guilty defendants with plausible 
innocence claims will be able to proclaim their innocence with-
out fear of contradiction. These claims can be extremely con-
vincing. As the director of the organization that sought to exon-
erate Richard Coleman, whose guilt was posthumously 
confirmed by DNA evidence, said of witnessing Coleman’s exe-
cution, at which Coleman continued to proclaim his innocence: 
“How can somebody, with such equanimity, such dignity, such 
quiet confidence, make those his final words even though he is 
guilty?”332 Although prisoners have always loudly and falsely 
asserted their innocence—even when their claims can be dis-
proven333—the government’s refusal to perform testing will look 
like a cover-up. In short, the fact that more than 260 people334 
have been exonerated by DNA despite the paucity of available 
evidence and numerous procedural hurdles has hurt public con-
 
public goods.” (citing Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1985)). 
 329. Id. at 1387; see also Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Crimi-
nal Defendants’ Waiver of the Right to Appeal—An Unacceptable Condition of 
a Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 664 
(1990) (arguing that “[b]y allowing prosecutors to secure from defendants a 
waiver of their rights to appeal, courts are becoming accomplices to police vio-
lations and trial court errors”).  
 330. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1387.  
 331. See, e.g., Editorial, Truth and Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, 
at WK7 (praising the Justice Department’s decision to limit the use of DNA 
waivers in plea agreements and stating that the decision sends “a valuable 
message to all prosecutors that while the finality of convictions is important, 
justice must take priority”).  
 332. Michael D. Shear and Maria Glod, DNA Tests Support 1992 Virginia 
Execution, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at B1 (quoting James C. McCloskey).  
 333. Jacobi & Caroll, supra note 38, at 270 (“Even among those cases vet-
ted and supported by innocence projects, in an estimated fifty to sixty percent, 
testing further implicate[s] the defendant.” (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 334. See supra note 3. 
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fidence in the justice system; the use of DNA waivers will do 
the same. 
B. JUSTIFICATIONS 
As seen, there are strong reasons to be skeptical of DNA 
waivers. There are also, of course, potential benefits to their 
use. This Section will consider these justifications before the 
Article concludes with an evaluation of the merits of DNA 
waivers. First, DNA waivers may preserve scarce testing re-
sources by screening out the truly guilty. Second, and relatedly, 
DNA waivers may slightly reduce the number of innocent peo-
ple who plead guilty by increasing the cost of doings so. Finally, 
waivers may produce more meaningful guilty pleas: defendants 
who plead guilty without giving up the right to future DNA 
testing may still cling, publicly and privately, to fantasies of 
innocence.  
1. Reducing Unmeritorious Claims 
To the extent that it is true that, faced with a demand for a 
DNA waiver, most innocent defendants will accept a harsher 
punishment or insist on trial, DNA waivers may provide a 
worthwhile mechanism to prevent the truly guilty from wasting 
testing resources.335 As the First Circuit has noted in the appeal 
waiver context, “With court-appointed counsel freely available 
and nothing to lose by trying, a defendant, unfettered by a 
waiver agreement, is quite likely to appeal on a wing and a 
prayer.”336 Tonja Jacobi and Gwendolyn Carroll have argued 
convincingly that the same is true of requests for DNA test-
ing.337 This is because “[t]he chance of a false negative result, 
however small, creates the possibility that guilty parties will 
benefit from seeking post-conviction DNA testing.”338 Thus, in 
the absence of any disincentive, guilty prisoners will seek test-
 
 335. On similar grounds, some authors have argued that DNA testing 
should not be available to those who have pleaded guilty. 
 336. United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2001).  
 337. Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 38, at 270 (“Even among those cases vet-
ted and supported by innocence projects, in an estimated fifty to sixty percent, 
testing ‘further implicate[s] the defendant.’ However, even these figures un-
derstate the problem. These figures do not mean that forty to fifty percent of 
those granted post-conviction DNA testing are exonerated by the tests. Many 
results are neither exculpatory nor guilt-confirming; they are inconclusive.” 
(quoting Stephanie Simon, DNA Tests for Inmates Debated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2003, at A10)). 
 338. Id. at 275. 
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ing, despite the fact that it is extremely likely to inculpate 
them further. This is a problem, because requests for DNA test-
ing can be expensive in terms of the cost of tests themselves 
and prosecutorial resources devoted to screening, thus poten-
tially crowding out meritorious claims.339 In addition, false 
claims can impose costs on victims and their families—costs 
that pre-DNA rules of finality functioned to avoid.340 Some dis-
incentive is needed, then, to prevent false claims of innocence 
from “overwhelming the . . . system.”341 Allowing DNA waivers 
could provide this disincentive in the form of the additional 
penalty (or perhaps a trial) that a prosecutor would demand in 
exchange for a defendant’s refusal to sign. 
The danger, of course, is that as discussed above, some of 
the few innocent defendants who plead guilty will—along with 
the many truly guilty—choose to sign the waivers rather than 
pay the price for not doing so. This is a significant cost in a sys-
tem that is designed, after all, to protect the rare wrongfully 
convicted defendant. As Professor Alschuler has observed in a 
different context: “Forcing all defendants who submit Alford 
pleas to confess at gunpoint or entering automatic guilty pleas 
on their behalf would similarly improve the accuracy of the 
‘typical’ defendant’s statement. Aggregate accuracy of this sort 
belongs in Alice in Wonderland.”342 The same may be said of 
pushing all defendants who plead guilty to sign DNA waivers. 
2. Reducing False Guilty Pleas 
Although the potential of DNA waivers to prevent the ex-
oneration of wrongfully convicted defendants is straightfor-
ward, their availability may, less obviously, benefit innocent 
defendants at the pretrial stage. For the innocent, giving up the 
right to future DNA testing is, even if there is no evidence im-
mediately available for testing, an extremely costly concession; 
 
 339. See id. at 268–69; see also Stone, supra note 185, at 62–67 (explaining 
that DNA testing in one case may cost “from $2,500 to $5,000” and describing 
the preservation and manpower costs associated with DNA testing). 
 340. See Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 337, at 268–69 (explaining the costs 
to victims presented by DNA testing). 
 341. Id. at 270. Jacobi and Carroll’s proposed solution to this problem is to 
punish false innocence claims with further incarceration. Id. at 276 (“This 
Part [of the article] provides an economic model that illustrates that, by pun-
ishing prisoners with additional incarceration if DNA tests confirm their guilt, 
states can structure incentives such that innocent prisoners will seek post-
conviction DNA testing and guilty prisoners will not.”). 
 342. Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The 
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1417 (2003). 
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for the guilty, it is virtually costless.343 Reluctance to sign a 
DNA waiver may therefore act as a signal of innocence, and 
this additional information could help guide prosecutors in bor-
derline cases.344 On the other hand, the value of this signal will 
likely be greatly diminished by truly guilty defendants attempt-
ing to mimic “innocent” behavior by refusing to agree to a waiv-
er—and, perhaps, by those who are unwilling to take that final 
step towards truly acknowledging their guilt. 
There is a chance that that prosecutorial insistence on a 
DNA waiver may cause some innocent defendants to elect to go 
to trial.345 At minimum, in a very limited number of the cases 
the DNA waiver may jolt an innocent defendant planning to 
plead guilty into reconsidering that decision.346 The waiver re-
minds the defendant that he is not just giving up a right to tri-
al, but the right to establish his innocence should the means be 
available. As one waiver in the Southern District of Illinois 
provides: 
The Defendant states that knowing and understanding his right to 
request DNA testing, he knowingly and voluntarily waivers and gives 
up that right. . . . He further understands that he is waiving the right 
to request DNA testing of evidence in this case in the current proceed-
ing, in any proceeding following conviction under . . . [the Innocence 
Protection Act] and in any other type of proceeding in which DNA 
testing may be requested. He fully understands that, as a result of his 
waiver . . . that he will never have another opportunity to have the ev-
idence in this case submitted for DNA testing or to employ the results 
of DNA testing to support a claim that he is actually innocent of the of-
fense(s) to which he pleads guilty pursuant to this Plea Agreement.347 
Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that the existence vel non of 
a speculative future opportunity to establish their innocence is 
 
 343. See Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 38, at 270–76 (explaining that, due to 
the small possibility of a false negative, truly guilty prisoners have an incentive 
to seek DNA testing even though it will very likely inculpate them further). 
 344. Cf. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the 
Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 430, 503 (2000) (“[T]he right to silence helps factfinders distin-
guish between factually innocent and guilty suspects and defend-
ants. . . . [U]nder the right-to-silence regime . . . innocents still tell the truth, 
whereas guilty suspects separate themselves by rationally exercising the 
right.”). 
 345. Cf. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1382 (“If the law made it harder for inno-
cent defendants to plead guilty, it would minimize both actual and perceived 
injustices.”). 
 346. Cf. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 231 (discussing the empirical evi-
dence that some defendants avoid plea agreements that include appeal waivers). 
 347. Plea Agreement § III.7.A., at 11, United States v. McPike, Criminal 
No. 05-30069-WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005)) (emphasis added).   
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a meaningful factor for many of the innocent defendants who 
plead guilty. 
3. Encouraging Stronger Admissions of Guilt 
Finally, a guilty plea unaccompanied by a waiver of DNA 
testing may weaken the strength of the guilt admission because 
it leaves room for the defendant to revisit this admission in the 
future.348 In this respect, the debate mirrors that over the use of 
nolo contendere and Alford pleas. A guilty plea is supposed to 
be a full admission that the defendant is guilty.349 Every factor 
that makes the plea any less of a full admission of guilt may be 
viewed as weakening that admission—both when the admis-
sion is made and in the future, when the defendant may change 
his mind and decide to challenge his conviction through DNA 
testing. 
As Professor Stephanos Bibas has noted, “[T]he criminal 
law seeks to lead offenders to repent by humbling them, to ex-
act moral sanctions, and then to return them to the community 
as equals. Offenders cannot accept responsibility and repent 
until they admit their actions.”350 Offenders, however, some-
times resist the “painful truth by lying to themselves and oth-
ers.”351 The availability of postconviction DNA testing may al-
low guilty defendants to cling to the idea that they will one day 
prove their innocence, thus delaying coming to terms with their 
guilt or avoiding it altogether. Pushing offenders to give up the 
right to testing, then, could help them reach “catharsis.”352  
Whether or not DNA waivers might prove therapeutic for 
some guilty defendants, however, the treatment is clearly 
harmful to the innocent. As Professor Albert Alschuler ob-
 
 348. See Daina Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should 
Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who 
Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1439 (2004) (“Giving a defendant who 
pled guilty access to post-conviction DNA testing suggests that the defendant 
lied about his guilt when entering his plea, thus undermining the basic as-
sumption that guilty pleas are voluntary, intelligent and truthful.”). 
 349. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“A plea of 
guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal ele-
ments necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful  
sentence.”). 
 350. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1393. 
 351. Id.; see also David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 285 (1993) (“The acceptance of 
nolo and Alford pleas from sex offenders, however, may reinforce cognitive dis-
tortions and denial.”). 
 352. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1400. 
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served in his response to Professor Bibas, “[i]f the time for shat-
tering pride ever comes, it comes only after a determination of 
guilt.”353 Similarly, if the law can be used to help the truly 
guilty, surely it should not do so at the expense of the truly  
innocent. 
  CONCLUSION   
The right to DNA testing in the United States has become 
well-established. Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government allow some defendants limited ac-
cess to postconviction DNA testing.354 These rights are the ex-
ception to the normal rules of finality, granted because of 
DNA’s exceptional accuracy. This accuracy, and the exonera-
tions it has produced, have led to a reconsideration of cher-
ished, but empirically untested, notions of the reliability of the 
criminal justice system. They have also, albeit incompletely, 
provoked a renewed commitment—reflected in new ethical 
rules, compensation schemes, and the testing statutes them-
selves—to the protection of innocence. But there is a danger 
that, as has happened with other advances in the protections 
afforded to the accused, the scope of DNA testing rights, and 
the spirit embodied in them, will erode as they lose their novel-
ty. There is evidence that this has already begun. DNA waiv-
ers—through which a defendant gives up the right to the test-
ing, and possibly preservation, of DNA evidence—were sought 
by federal prosecutors in several populous districts between 
2004 and early 2010. The history of similar innovations in plea 
bargaining also suggests that the use of DNA waivers may 
spread to the states. It is therefore important to evaluate the 
validity of these waivers and to consider their implications for 
defendants, prosecutors, the public, and the criminal justice 
system as a whole. 
The great weight of federal precedent suggests that DNA 
waivers are valid. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
validity of waiver is to be presumed for even the most funda-
mental of constitutional and statutory rights. Waivers must be 
knowing and voluntary, but in the criminal context this stand-
ard tolerates ignorance of many critical facts—including, possi-
bly, the existence of exculpatory evidence. Some lower courts 
have fashioned a “miscarriage of justice” exception to the en-
 
 353. Alschuler, supra note 342, at 1421.  
 354. See supra notes 21–23. 
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forceability of similar waivers, but the extension of this doc-
trine to the DNA waiver is as speculative as it is desirable.  
If, then, DNA waivers are likely to be generally enforcea-
ble, are they good policy? The risks are clear: for the same rea-
sons some innocent people plead guilty—including the suppres-
sion of evidence—some innocent people will also sign DNA 
waivers, perpetuating the injustice. If these were the only costs, 
DNA waivers, if used judiciously, might be justifiable. This is 
because their benefits are also clear: spurious postconviction 
innocence claims waste valuable resources and cause needless 
harm to victims and families, and claims by those who have 
both pleaded guilty and waived their right to future testing 
may be especially likely to be spurious. Moreover, the use of 
waivers may discourage some innocent defendants from plead-
ing guilty and push the truly guilty towards a fuller admission 
of their culpability. Indeed, in cases in which a defendant’s 
guilt has already been conclusively established by DNA evi-
dence, there is very little likelihood of injustice resulting from a 
denial of future testing; these may be the “exceptional” cases 
the Justice Department’s new waiver policy contemplates. 
The risk of preventing the exoneration of some innocent de-
fendants is not the only cost of DNA waivers, however. The re-
moval of the check provided by DNA testing will eliminate an 
incentive for accuracy and ethical behavior among prosecutors. 
The commodification of the right to proof of innocence will 
erode the renewed commitment to preventing wrongful convic-
tions that has, to an extent, emerged in recent years. And per-
haps most importantly, the use of DNA waivers will devastate 
public confidence in the justice system. What could be, on its 
face, more contrary to the ideal of justice than to seek a guar-
antee that the most conclusive evidence of truth remain untest-
ed? Ultimately, although the ills DNA waivers seek to address 
are real, the treatment is worse than the disease. 
